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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) is a federal statute
that protects the rights of students with disabilities by conferring onto them a
substantive right to a free, appropriate public education (FAPE). Under the
IDEA, aggrieved parents may demand a “due process hearing,” an administrative
process presided over by an impartial hearing officer through which students and
families may seek redress for violations of the IDEA. Due process hearings, however, allow only for certain types of relief—notably, money damages are not available under the IDEA. Students with disabilities are also protected under other statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Parents may sue under these sister statutes but, in most cases, must
first exhaust their administrative remedies by seeking a due process hearing pursuant to 20 USC § 1415(l).
This Comment addresses an unanswered question about § 1415(l) that the
Supreme Court explicitly left unaddressed in its recent decision in Fry v Napoleon
Community Schools: if a family alleges a denial of a FAPE—which Fry held triggered exhaustion—but sought relief that the IDEA could not provide, including
money damages, is exhaustion required? With respect to this question, the lower
courts are split.
By applying principles of statutory interpretation, examining the history of
the IDEA, and considering the policy implications of exhaustion, this Comment
argues that exhaustion should not be required in such a case. This conclusion is
first rooted in the plain-language reading of the statute, a reading that is confirmed by comparing § 1415(l) to other federal statutes and to the ADA and § 504.
Moreover, considering the kinds of cases in which this question would arise by
applying the Fry standard reveals that waiving exhaustion in such a case creates
appropriate deterrence for schools and school districts. Consistent with the core
purpose of the IDEA, such a reading of the statute better vindicates the rights of
students with disabilities.
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INTRODUCTION
Abraham is a young student with Down syndrome living in
Los Angeles.1 He attends a specialized school for students with
unique educational needs. This placement allows Abraham to
receive tailored educational services but also segregates him
from nondisabled peers. That trade-off is a constant compromise
for families and educators of disabled children, but things seem
to be going fine for Abraham. That is, until 2014, when fourthgrade Abraham comes home from school with large bruises on
his forehead. His perplexed mother does not receive any explanation from school. Even more alarming, Abraham becomes
deeply fearful of going to physical education class, which, for
1
These facts are based on Abraham P. v Los Angeles Unified School District, 2017
WL 4839071, *1–3 (CD Cal).
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many elementary school students, is the most exciting part of
the day.
For the next two school years, the problem escalates.
Abraham’s behavior is getting worse, and his parents hear reports of him kicking and spitting at his classmates and teachers.
At the same time, Abraham remains terrified of going to school.
He comes home bruised, sometimes from self-inflicted injuries,
and the staff reports that he has urinated on himself. His parents are flummoxed, and their complaints to the school and to
the police have yielded no action. However, their child has particularized educational needs that not every school is equipped
to respond to, leaving them with few alternatives.
Abraham finally reports to his parents that the school bus
aide and his teacher have both hit him on several occasions.
Horrified, they refuse to send him back to school. Eventually,
after several rounds of discussion with the school district, they
are able to negotiate a different placement, and, thankfully,
Abraham’s fears of school dissipate. But his parents nonetheless
turn to the justice system—there have been fundamental
wrongs committed against their child, and they want justice for
him. What is the proper relief for Abraham and his family? And
what steps are required to obtain it?
In the United States, 6.6 million students, or 13 percent of
total public-school enrollment, receive special education services.2 Those children are protected under several statutes, but
the primary vehicle for guaranteeing that students with disabilities are provided with a quality education is the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act3 (IDEA). States that receive federal funding under the IDEA are required to provide students with
disabilities with a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE).4
The notion that disabled students deserve a quality education was not always the status quo in the United States. Before
the IDEA, disabled children “were excluded entirely from the
public school system and from being educated with their peers,”
“undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a
successful educational experience,” and “a lack of adequate resources within the public school system forced families to find
2
Children and Youth with Disabilities (National Center for Education Statistics,
May 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T7CV-DMXC.
3
Pub L No 101-476, 104 Stat 1103 (1990), codified as amended at 20 USC § 1400
et seq.
4
20 USC § 1412(a)(1)(A).
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services outside the public school system.”5 The IDEA has not
entirely eliminated these problems. But, at the very least, the
IDEA created a special education system that better protects
disabled students and, crucially, provided a mechanism by
which parents can demand that their children be adequately
served by their public school system. Nevertheless, schools can
and do fail their most vulnerable students. Sometimes those
failures are especially shocking, as in Abraham’s case. Indeed,
Abraham’s case was not an apocryphal story from a time before the IDEA; his case was decided by the Central District of
California in October 2017.6
The procedural safeguards of the IDEA create a roadmap for
parents and families to vindicate the rights of their disabled
children, but that roadmap does not lead straight to court. Before a parent may file a complaint, she must exhaust the administrative remedies available under the statute.7 Although there
are some exceptions to that principle, “the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement remains the general rule.”8 But the IDEA is not the
only statute that protects students with disabilities in school—
parents may sue under the IDEA’s sister statutes as well. The
question of when a parent is required to exhaust administrative
remedies in these sister-statute cases was unclear until recently,
when it was answered by Fry v Napoleon Community Schools.9
In that case, the Supreme Court held that when a complaint
alleges the denial of a FAPE—regardless of whether the complaint invokes the IDEA or a related statute—exhaustion is
required.10
Two footnotes in Fry posed the question that this Comment
addresses. In footnote four and footnote eight of the opinion,
Justice Elena Kagan was careful to clarify that the Court was declining to decide the following: “Is exhaustion required when the
plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE, but the specific remedy she requests—here, money damages for emotional distress—
is not one that an IDEA hearing officer may award?”11 This
Comment seeks to answer that question.
5

20 USC § 1400(c)(2)(B)–(D).
See generally Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071.
7
See 20 USC § 1415(l).
8
M.P. v Independent School District No 721, 326 F3d 975, 980 (8th Cir 2003).
9
137 S Ct 743 (2017).
10 Id at 752.
11 Id at 752 n 4. See also id at 754 n 8 (“[W]e do not address here . . . a case in
which a plaintiff, although charging the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy that
6
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To begin, Part I outlines the legal landscape within which
this question is situated, including the IDEA, the IDEA’s sister statutes, and Fry. Part II discusses the pre-Fry case law
and the circuit split over this lingering question. Part III suggests an answer to the question that Fry’s footnotes left for
another day. This Comment concludes that the correct answer
is no—exhaustion should be waived in cases in which the
plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but requests a form of relief
that is unavailable under the IDEA. This solution is rooted in
statutory interpretation, the purpose of the statute, and policy
considerations.
I. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
The IDEA is the primary vehicle for protecting American
children with disabilities in schools, but it is not the only law
that does so. Claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act12
(ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act13 can proceed without
recourse to the IDEA’s procedural safeguards due to the addition of § 1415(l) to the IDEA in 1990. Importantly, the kinds of
relief available under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act differ
from those forms of relief available under the IDEA. This Part
details the history and protections of the IDEA, provides an
overview of the related provisions and their connection to the
IDEA, and discusses how Fry changes the landscape of evaluating IDEA complaints.
A.

The IDEA

The IDEA originated as the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act14 (EHA) in 1975. Congress passed this law in response to classrooms and teachers that were ill equipped to educate children with differing needs. Congress designed the EHA
as a framework of federal protections to ensure that public
schools invested in teaching children with disabilities. The Act
conditioned the receipt of federal funds on compliance with its

an IDEA officer cannot give—for example, as in the Frys’ complaint, money damages for
resulting emotional injury.”).
12 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
13 Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355 (1973), codified at 29 USC § 701 et seq.
14 Pub L No 94-142, 89 Stat 773 (1975), codified at 20 USC § 1400 et seq.

992

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:987

provisions.15 The secretary of education gives to compliant states
special education assistance grants that are proportionate to
the number of students receiving special education services in
that state.16 In 1990, the Act was renamed the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act.17
Under the IDEA, eligible children must have a disability
that falls under one of the following categories: intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments,
visual impairments, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) falls
under this vaguely worded category), or specific learning disabilities.18 A child is eligible if, by reason of such a disability, she
requires “special education and related services.”19
The “centerpiece of the [IDEA’s] education delivery system
for disabled children” is the individualized education program
(IEP).20 An IEP team, consisting of school and district officials
and the child’s parents, creates a child’s IEP.21 The team confers
at least yearly to decide which required accommodations,
modifications, and related services the individual child needs
to receive an adequate public education.22 Accommodations,
modifications, and related services may include such services as:
a paraprofessional aide; time with the school social worker, occupational therapist, physical therapist, or other service provider;
preferential seating in the classroom; adaptive technology; and
partial- or full-day teaching in a special education classroom.23
The IEP is memorialized in a document that travels with the
child from district to district; every school is bound to, at minimum, implement the IEP as written.24
15 See 20 USC §§ 1411–12. Note that except when the differences are relevant, this
Comment does not distinguish between the EHA and the IDEA. “IDEA” refers to the
current state of the law regardless of when the individual provision was passed.
16 See 20 USC § 1411.
17 IDEA § 901(a)(1)–(3), 104 Stat at 1141–42, 20 USC § 1400(a).
18 20 USC § 1401(3)(A)(i).
19 20 USC § 1401(3)(A)(ii).
20 Honig v Doe, 484 US 305, 311 (1988).
21 20 USC § 1414(d)(1)(B).
22 20 USC § 1414(d)(4).
23 See 20 USC § 1401(26)(A). For the required components of the IEP, see 20 USC
§ 1414(d); 34 CFR § 300.320.
24 Courts differ as to the proper standard for evaluating improper-implementation
claims. As a general matter, courts are more willing to forgive minor mistakes in implementation but largely require faithful adherence to an IEP’s terms. See, for example,
Houston Independent School District v Bobby R., 200 F3d 341, 349 (5th Cir 2000) (holding
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Crucially, the IEP team structure is designed to ensure
individualization, and the menu of services available to the team
is broad. However, the team is bound by certain limiting principles. In particular, the IEP must ensure that each child is in his
or her “least restrictive environment.”25 That is, a child must be
integrated into the general education setting with reasonable,
appropriate support to the greatest extent possible.26 This provision is designed to prevent the languishing effect noticed by
Congress in 1975, wherein special education students shunted to
an alternative classroom were segregated, sometimes needlessly,
from their nondisabled peers.27
The IDEA promises that, thanks to their IEP, every covered
student shall receive a FAPE.28 Once a child is eligible under the
IDEA, she acquires a “substantive right” to a FAPE.29 The precise contours of the FAPE standard have been mapped out in
case law. Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central
School District, Westchester County v Rowley,30 an early case addressing the FAPE standard, held that a child receives a FAPE
when her program is “reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive educational benefits.”31 This was a victory for disabled
students in some sense because the school district argued that
the FAPE requirement was not a substantive requirement at all;
that holding would have rendered the IDEA toothless. Nonetheless, courts disagreed on the exact meanings of “reasonably calculated” and “educational benefits” for decades. Rowley made
clear that schoolchildren with IEPs were not necessarily entitled
to make progress commensurate with their nondisabled peers.32
that the plaintiffs’ allegation of a failure to implement the IEP must show that the failure was more than de minimis); Van Duyn v Baker School District 5J, 502 F3d 811, 819
(9th Cir 2007) (“[O]nly material failures to implement an IEP constitute violations of the
IDEA.”).
25 20 USC § 1412(a)(5).
26 20 USC § 1412(a)(5)(A).
27 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, HR Rep No 94-332,
94th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1975) (“In 1966, . . . only about one-third of the approximately 5.5
million handicapped children were being provided an appropriate special education. The
remaining two-thirds were either totally excluded from schools or sitting idle in regular
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’”).
28 20 USC § 1412(a)(1)(A).
29 Fry, 137 S Ct at 749.
30 458 US 176 (1982).
31 Id at 207. This standard applies if the IEP was properly constructed through the
procedures of the Act. Procedural deficiencies may also be the basis for legal recourse. Id
at 206.
32 See id at 198.
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Some courts determined that a FAPE nonetheless entitled the
student to meaningful educational benefits, while others suggested that educational benefits had to be merely more than de
minimis (some benefit as opposed to no benefits).33
The Supreme Court resolved the circuit split and defined a
FAPE more precisely in the 2017 case Endrew F. v Douglas
County School District RE-1.34 Per the Endrew F. court, to meet
the FAPE requirement, “a school must offer an IEP reasonably
calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in
light of the child’s circumstances.”35 Consistent with the IDEA’s
emphasis on individualization, determining whether a district
has provided a FAPE post–Endrew F. requires holistic consideration of a student’s circumstances and of what progress should
look like for that child.36 Albeit far from a bright-line rule, “this
standard is markedly more demanding than the ‘merely more
than de minimis’” standard proffered by several lower courts.37
A parent alleging that her child’s school has failed to provide a FAPE—whether by crafting a deficient IEP, failing to
comprehensively implement the IEP, or failing to identify that
her child needed an IEP38—may seek recourse for the school’s
failures via the procedural safeguards of the IDEA.39 The parent
or another education rights holder may file a complaint with her
state educational agency, initiating a procedure known as a “due
process hearing.”40 Procedural requirements are crafted by each
state’s education agency and thus vary state to state.41
For a sampling of what procedural safeguards look like in
some of the largest school districts in the country, consider first
33 Compare, for example, Deal v Hamilton County Board of Education, 392 F3d
840, 861–63 (6th Cir 2004) (“IDEA requires an IEP to confer a meaningful educational
benefit gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue.”) (quotation marks and
citation omitted), with Sytsema v Academy School District No 20, 538 F3d 1306, 1313
(10th Cir 2008) (“This court has interpreted the Rowley standard to require an educational benefit that is more than de minimis.”).
34 137 S Ct 988 (2017).
35 Id at 999.
36 Id at 999–1000.
37 Id at 1000.
38 Schools are required to identify children who may need special education services under the IDEA’s “Child Find” provision. 20 USC § 1412(a)(3).
39 See 20 USC § 1415.
40 20 USC § 1415(f).
41 See 20 USC § 1415(a) (delegating to state authorities the responsibility to “establish and maintain procedures” to ensure that students with disabilities and their families are “guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education”).
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Chicago Public Schools (CPS) (371,382 students in school year
2017–2018, 13.7 percent of whom have IEPs).42 CPS students
have the option of filing a complaint with the Illinois State
Board of Education, which will then initiate an investigation
and render a conclusion that may or may not include a recommendation for a remedy.43 They may also or instead file a formal
due process request, which will initiate a hearing presided over
by an Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO).44 Parents may alternatively or additionally request mediation.45 By contrast, in New
York City (more than 1,000,000 students enrolled in school year
2016–2017, of whom 221,198 students, or 19.4 percent, have
disabilities),46 the Department of Education first requires an initial hearing. Either the parent or the district may appeal to a
state review officer from the New York State Department of
Education within thirty days of the decision.47 Finally, in the Los
Angeles Unified School District (more than 633,000 students in
school year 2016–2017, of whom 12 percent receive special education services),48 mediation is generally required as a prerequisite to a hearing; after that additional step, the hearing proceeds
similarly to other states.49
This overview of procedural safeguards in several large
school districts across the country illustrates the steps parents
must take before vindicating their rights in court. The administrative process “generally mirrors the procedural and adversarial nature of an action in civil court, resulting in an elongated
trial-like process.”50 Like a lawsuit, the process begins with a

42 CPS
Stats
and
Facts
(Chicago
Public Schools),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/25WY-WKX4.
43 Procedural Safeguards and Parental Supports (Chicago Public Schools), archived
at http://perma.cc/J6ZU-NBQB.
44 How to Address Concerns: The Dispute Process (Chicago Public Schools), archived
at http://perma.cc/UZC3-2MJX.
45 Id.
46 NYC Department of Education, Annual Enrollment Snapshot, online at
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/data/default.htm (visited Mar 25, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (Demographic Snapshots spreadsheet).
47 NYC Department of Education, Family Guide to Special Education Services for
School-Age Children: A Shared Path to Success *38–39, archived at
http://perma.cc/G2NF-AUEE.
48 Los Angeles Unified (Ed Data), archived at http://perma.cc/P264-KD2R.
49 California Office of Administrative Hearings, Special Education Handbook *14–
15 (2016), archived at http://perma.cc/S2QU-QHRR.
50 Kent Sparks, Comment, Requiring Administrative Exhaustion While the School
Shuts Down: An Insurmountable Barrier to Seeking IDEA Enforcement, 2014 Mich St L
Rev 1161, 1173.
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formal complaint, which triggers often lengthy procedural
steps.51 At the hearing itself, complainants have the right to representation by counsel,52 the right to a transcript of the proceedings,53 and “the right to present evidence and confront, crossexamine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.”54 As such,
while not a civil lawsuit, a due process hearing can still be a
costly and drawn-out process.
There are strong arguments in favor of the due process
hearing: the impartial hearing officers have deep expertise in
this area of the law, judicial efficiency is promoted by filtering
out some cases, and state agencies have an interest in resolving
education disputes, to name a few.55 Nonetheless, there are
sometimes compelling reasons to waive exhaustion, which would
permit the aggrieved party to go straight to court to redress
their claims. The general standard is that exhaustion can be
waived when its pursuit would be “futile or inadequate.”56 This
standard is not unique to the IDEA; in some other administrative contexts, courts also ask whether exhaustion would be futile
or inadequate to determine whether waiver is appropriate.57
If the student prevails at the due process hearing, the relief
to which she is entitled may take several forms. Relief available
under the IDEA is equitable in nature, and courts have “broad discretion” to craft an appropriate remedy.58 IHOs commonly grant
compensatory education, meaning “education services designed to

51 Andria B. Saia, Meeting Special Needs: Special Education Due Process Hearings,
79 Pa Bar Assoc Q 1, 3–6 (2008) (describing the steps to IDEA procedural safeguards
and noting that procedural safeguards under the IDEA mandate “a process that is very
much like the filing of any civil complaint” and that the timeline for a due process hearing is “rarely, if ever, met”).
52 20 USC § 1415(h)(1).
53 20 USC § 1415(h)(3).
54 20 USC § 1415(h)(2).
55 For further discussion of these arguments, see Part III.C.5.
56 Honig, 484 US at 327. Inadequacy exceptions arise when “structural, systemic
reforms are sought” or when the substantive claims challenge the administrative proceedings themselves. Hoeft v Tucson Unified School District, 967 F2d 1298, 1309 (9th Cir 1992).
57 See, for example, Holt v Town of Stonington, 765 F3d 127, 130 (2d Cir 2014)
(stating that futility and inadequacy are exceptions to the administrative exhaustion requirement in a state zoning dispute); Citadel Securities, LLC v Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Inc, 808 F3d 694, 700 (7th Cir 2015) (applying the “futile or inadequate”
standard to Securities and Exchange Commission administrative procedures).
58 Florence County School District Four v Carter, 510 US 7, 16 (1993), quoting School
Committee of the Town of Burlington v Department of Education of Massachusetts, 471 US
359, 369 (1985).

2018]

Vindication for Students with Disabilities

997

make up for past deficiencies in a child’s program.”59 However,
relief can also include tuition reimbursement for a student’s private school placement after a unilateral transfer,60 prospective
changes to the IEP, or reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation.61 One study of IHO decisions found that, of
the due process hearings in which the IHO granted relief for the
denial of a FAPE, 44 percent provided tuition reimbursement
and 39 percent provided compensatory education (these categories are not mutually exclusive; an IHO may give both).62 Crucially, however, compensatory and punitive damages are not
available under the IDEA.63 That is, parents may not receive a
pure payout through a due process procedure, but they may receive educational services or funding earmarked specifically for
educational services (both of which would fall under compensatory education).
B.

Related Statutes: The ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act

The IDEA is not the only statute that protects children with
disabilities. Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act perform similar functions. The relevant provision of the
ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
any such entity.”64 Section 504 states that no individual “shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”65

59 Boose v District of Columbia, 786 F3d 1054, 1056 (DC Cir 2015), citing Reid v
District of Columbia, 401 F3d 516, 522–23 (DC Cir 2005).
60 See Burlington, 471 US at 369.
61 20 USC § 1415(b)(1).
62 Perry A. Zirkel, Adjudicative Remedies for Denials of FAPE under the IDEA, 33 J
Natl Assoc Admin L Judiciary 214, 229 (2013).
63 See Lewis M. Wasserman, Delineating Administrative Exhaustion Requirements
and Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: Lessons from the Case Law and Proposals for Congressional Action, 29 J
Natl Assoc Admin L Judiciary 349, 365 (2009).
64 42 USC § 12132.
65 Rehabilitation Act § 504, 87 Stat at 394, 29 USC § 794(a).
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In practice, the ADA and § 504 cover more individuals with
disabilities than the IDEA does. Students eligible under the
IDEA must have a disability that specifically causes them to require special education services, whereas under the ADA and
§ 504, the disability need only interfere with a major life activity
(not necessarily education).66 Moreover, the ADA Amendments
Act of 200867 added the expansive qualifier to the ADA that
“[t]he definition of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage of individuals.”68 As a result, students with IEPs
may often be entitled to coverage under § 504 and the ADA. The
reverse, however, is true only if the student’s needs fit under the
IDEA’s more confined definition. Section 504 in particular is
widely used in schools to institute accommodations for IDEAineligible students through the creation of “504 plans.” Not unlike an IEP, a 504 plan memorializes the accommodations that a
child’s school commits to provide so that the child receives a
FAPE. The requirements of a 504 plan are not as stringent as
the IEP and do not necessarily need to be in writing.69
The EHA (the IDEA’s precursor) originally precluded recourse under its sister statutes. In Smith v Robinson,70 the
Supreme Court held that “Congress intended the EHA to be the
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal
protection claim to a publicly financed special education.”71 The
Court reasoned that the EHA scheme was comprehensive and
holding otherwise would render the procedures of the statute
superfluous.72 Congress disagreed and responded by passing the
Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986.73 That act amended the EHA by adding § 1415(l), which expressly permits remedies “under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act

66 Compare 20 USC § 1401(3)(A) (defining the group of people eligible under the
IDEA as those children with a qualifying disability who require special education services), with 42 USC § 12102(1) (defining an individual with a disability under the ADA
as a person with a physical or mental impairment for whom that disability limits a
major life activity). See also 29 USC § 705(20)(B) (stating that the definition of “individual with a disability” for most provisions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act corresponds to
the ADA’s definition of the same).
67 Pub L No 110-325, 122 Stat 3553, codified at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
68 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3(4)(A), 122 Stat at 3555.
69 See Protecting Students with Disabilities (Department of Education), archived at
http://perma.cc/M49R-HRCZ.
70 468 US 992 (1984).
71 Id at 1009.
72 See id at 1009–11.
73 Pub L No 99-372, 100 Stat 796, codified at 20 USC § 1415.
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of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.”74
However, IDEA procedures still must be exhausted if the
plaintiff is “seeking relief that is also available” under the IDEA.75
C.

Fry

Because of the interplay between the ADA, § 504, and the
IDEA, it remained unclear until recently whether claims
brought under the related statutes required exhaustion. Courts
of appeals suggested different approaches to determining when
exhaustion was required, but the Supreme Court resolved the
question in Fry. In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, the
Court held that exhaustion is required “when the gravamen of a
complaint seeks redress for a school’s failure to provide a FAPE.”76
In Fry, the student, E.F., disputed her district’s decision to
bar her goldendoodle, Wonder, from accompanying her to school.
The school argued that all of her educational needs were being
met by a one-on-one aide, rendering the dog superfluous. Her
parents filed a complaint with the US Department of Education
Office of Civil Rights, which issued a decision that found that,
under Title II of the ADA and § 504, the school discriminated
against E.F. even if the FAPE standard was met. The Frys
therefore sued under Title II and § 504, but not the IDEA.77 The
district court dismissed the action, citing the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.78 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of when exhaustion was required for education-related suits under related statutes or the Constitution.79
The Court first held that exhaustion is required only when
the plaintiff is seeking relief for denial of a FAPE. A hearing
officer, the Court reasoned, cannot give relief for anything else.80
Nonetheless, a school’s conduct toward a disabled child may still
cause a cognizable injury other than denying her a FAPE; in
such a case, exhaustion is unnecessary.81 The Court then held

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

20 USC § 1415(l).
20 USC § 1415(l).
Fry, 137 S Ct at 755.
Id at 751–52.
Id at 752.
Id.
Fry, 137 S Ct at 753.
Id at 754.
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that in determining whether a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, one must look to the gravamen of the plaintiff’s
complaint.82 It matters not that the complaint failed to evoke the
IDEA. What matters is whether the complainant “is in essence
contesting the adequacy of a special education program.”83 One
tool the Court suggested was to ask whether the plaintiff could
have brought the same complaint with respect to another type of
public facility. If the complaint is uniquely school related, then it
probably does concern a FAPE.84 The Court also suggested that
if an adult at the school could bring the same claim, the plaintiff
is less likely to have alleged a denial of a FAPE.85
The Court remanded E.F.’s case to the court below, but implied that the facts as alleged did not constitute a denial of a
FAPE. The Frys never claimed that E.F.’s educational services
or IEP were deficient; indeed, the one-on-one human aide satisfied all of her educational needs.86 Instead, they alleged that “the
school districts infringed E.F.’s right to equal access” even as
they complied with the IDEA.87 However, the possibility remained that the Frys’ pursuit of IDEA remedies prior to this litigation constituted evidence that the gravamen of the complaint
was a denial of a FAPE.88
The contours of what kinds of complaints allege a denial of a
FAPE are not yet well defined in the lower courts.89 Assuming
the Fry family never sought IDEA relief, the facts of Fry are
probably the paradigmatic non-FAPE case. By all accounts, E.F.
and her parents were content with the IEP, and the school implemented the IEP completely. The problem was physical access
to the facility itself, not the content of E.F.’s education. While
lack of access to the school building is peripherally related to
access to educational content, this case is easily decided by the
questions posed by Kagan: Would this be cognizable if it occurred in a different public sphere? Yes, if a library denied entry

82

Id at 755.
Id.
84 Fry, 137 S Ct at 756.
85 Id.
86 Id at 758.
87 Id.
88 See Fry, 137 S Ct at 758.
89 For further discussion of how the lower courts have treated Fry and the issues
that have arisen with respect to delineating FAPE from non-FAPE allegations, see
Part III.C.
83
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to a person’s service dog, that person could sue under the ADA.90
Could an adult in the building bring the same claim? Also yes—
if a teacher’s service dog were denied entry, she too would have
a case.91
But the question whether a complaint alleges denial of a
FAPE becomes less clear if the injury is more obviously connected to the educational program. For example, if a child has restraint procedures92 in his IEP, and he is injured in the course of
a faulty restraint, then the injury is intertwined with his educational program. Yet, that injury could have conceivably occurred
in a library or theater, as well. This ambiguity is being ironed
out in lower courts, but this Comment contends that cases like
the above example should be considered a denial of a FAPE.93
And in some cases, even if a FAPE is implicated, exhaustion
should nonetheless be waived when the relief sought cannot be
granted by an IHO.94
II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE ROLE OF RELIEF
In two footnotes, the Fry Court expressly left open the following question: If a complaint alleges the denial of a FAPE, but
seeks a form of relief unavailable under the IDEA, such as compensatory or punitive damages, does the student still need to
exhaust administrative remedies? In footnote four, the Court
noted that “[t]he Frys, along with the Solicitor General, say the
answer is no.”95 It reiterates the open question in footnote eight:
Once again, we do not address here (or anywhere else in
this opinion) a case in which a plaintiff, although charging
the denial of a FAPE, seeks a form of remedy that an IDEA
90 See, for example, Spector v Norwegian Cruise Line, 545 US 119, 128 (2005)
(“Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the full and equal
enjoyment of public accommodations.”), citing 42 USC § 12182(a).
91 See Spector, 545 US at 128.
92 Under certain circumstances, a student’s safety or that of others might require a
school official to physically restrain a student. For a summary of all states’ rules on these
kinds of procedures, see generally US Department of Education, Summary of Seclusion
and Restraint Statutes, Regulations, Policies and Guidance, by State and Territory:
Information as Reported to the Regional Comprehensive Centers and Gathered from
Other Sources (Feb 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/7DF8-ALZ9.
93 See Part III.
94 For more discussion of the tension between the clues in Fry and educationrelated injuries, see Part III.C.1.
95 Fry, 137 S Ct at 752 n 4. See also generally Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, Docket No 15-497 (US filed Aug 29, 2016)
(available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4524537) (“Solicitor General Brief ”).
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officer cannot give—for example, as in the Frys’ complaint,
money damages for resulting emotional injury.96
This lingering uncertainty is the question at the heart of
this Comment. This Part begins by detailing the opinions of circuit courts that have explicitly reached the question. Before and
after Fry, most circuit courts that had ruled on the issue required exhaustion. But Fry explicitly left this particular question open; Parts II.A–C attempt to unfold how the circuits stand
in the wake of that case.
After evaluating the appellate-court precedent, Part II.D
examines a subset of cases in which exhaustion was waived for
reasons unrelated to the relief sought. Fry calls these cases into
question.
A.

Circuits That Have Explicitly Rejected Waiving Exhaustion
on the Basis of Unavailable Relief

In Charlie F. v Board of Education of Skokie School District
68,97 the Seventh Circuit conceded that compensatory damages
are not available as relief under the IDEA but nonetheless required exhaustion. The court reasoned that the due process proceedings might be able to provide relief.98 In that case, the young
Charlie F. was happy with his present education plan but sued
under § 504, the Constitution, and the ADA over humiliating
experiences in the prior grade.99 The Seventh Circuit refused to
allow the family to skip the due process hearing because the
injury was educational in nature.100 Note that this is not the approach in Fry, which abrogated Charlie F. by rejecting the injurycentered approach to exhaustion as a general matter and instead embraced an inquiry focused on whether the complaint
alleged a denial of a FAPE. Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit’s
general rejection of the relevance of the prayer for relief to the
question of exhaustion has been cited by many other circuits.101

96

Fry, 137 S Ct at 754 n 8.
98 F3d 989 (7th Cir 1996).
98 Id at 993.
99 Id at 990–91.
100 Id at 993.
101 See, for example, Polera v Board of Education of Newburgh Enlarged City School
District, 288 F3d 478, 487 (2d Cir 2002) (“The opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in [Charlie F.] is particularly instructive.”).
97

2018]

Vindication for Students with Disabilities

1003

The First,102 Second,103 Eighth,104 Tenth,105 and Eleventh106
Circuits have also dealt squarely with the question and rejected
the idea that the form of relief sought can control whether exhaustion is waived. At least one appellate court—the Eighth
Circuit in J.M. v Francis Howell School District107—answered
the question post-Fry and came to the same conclusion.108
One common argument permeates these cases: if courts
were to allow the form of relief to dictate whether the plaintiff
must exhaust, they would create a roadmap for circumvention.
Courts fear that parents simply will ask for money to evade a
due process hearing or wait to file a complaint until they can
argue that educational benefits would no longer address their
child’s injury (because he has graduated, changed districts, or
the like).109

102 See Frazier v Fairhaven School Committee, 276 F3d 52, 63 (1st Cir 2002)
(“[Waiving exhaustion] would allow a plaintiff to bypass the administrative procedures
merely by crafting her complaint to seek relief that educational authorities are powerless
to grant.”). The First Circuit also compared the IDEA to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321 (1995), to justify mandating exhaustion.
Frazier, 276 F3d at 61–62. For the reasons discussed in Part III.A.2, the comparison is
not as apt as the court presents. Indeed, the PLRA informs a reading of § 1415(l) that
waives exhaustion.
103 See Polera, 288 F3d at 487 (determining that plaintiffs are “not permitted to
evade the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement merely by tacking on a request for money
damages”).
104 See J.M. v Francis Howell School District, 850 F3d 944, 950 (8th Cir 2017)
(noting that Fry declined to address the question, but nonetheless deciding that the family was not exempt from exhaustion because they sought compensatory and punitive
damages).
105 See Cudjoe v Independent School District No 12, 297 F3d 1058, 1066 (10th Cir
2002) (“[T]he IDEA’s exhaustion requirement will not be excused simply because a
plaintiff requests damages.”).
106 See N.B. v Alachua County School Board, 84 F3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir 1996) (per
curiam) (adopting wholesale and verbatim in a one-sentence opinion the district court’s
reasoning that “if the plaintiff ’s argument is to be accepted, then future litigants could
avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by asking for relief that administrative authorities could not grant”).
107 850 F3d 944 (8th Cir 2017).
108 Id at 950.
109 See, for example, Polera, 288 F3d at 490 (“[D]isabled-student plaintiffs . . .
should not be permitted to ‘sit on’ live claims and spurn the administrative process that
could provide the educational services they seek, then later sue for damages.”); Fraser v
Tamalpais Union High School District, 281 Fed Appx 746, 747 (9th Cir 2008) (refusing
to waive exhaustion for a then-graduated student whose injuries could have been resolved under the administrative process had they been timely raised).
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The Third Circuit

The Third Circuit is an outlier in that it has relied on the
plain-language reading of § 1415(l) to waive exhaustion. In W.B.
v Matula,110 the plaintiff parents brought an action under 42
USC § 1983, Rehabilitation Act § 504, and the IDEA, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for failure to provide a
FAPE.111 According to W.B., the school failed to identify that her
child, who had been diagnosed with ADHD, Tourette’s syndrome, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, needed special education services.112 When the school finally acknowledged his disability, the district refused to give him an IEP because he was
performing at or above grade level.113 W.B. engaged in several
administrative proceedings—seeking an independent evaluation, development of an IEP, a different disability classification,
and attorney’s fees—which ended in a settlement between the
school district and the family.114
W.B. then sued, alleging a denial of a FAPE, an issue that
the previous administrative hearings did not address. But this
time, happy with her child’s current IEP and educational situation, she sought relief unavailable under the IDEA. The court relied on a plain-language reading of § 1415(l), holding that “it
would be futile, perhaps even impossible, for plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies because the relief sought by
plaintiffs in this action was unavailable in IDEA administrative
proceedings.”115 The Third Circuit noted that “[w]here recourse
to IDEA administrative proceedings would be futile or inadequate [ ] the exhaustion requirement is excused.”116 Matula has
since been abrogated on other grounds.117 Nevertheless, this case
stands for the proposition that the Third Circuit has waived exhaustion when the relief sought cannot be granted by an IHO.
110

67 F3d 484 (3d Cir 1995).
Id at 491.
112 Id at 488–89.
113 Id at 489.
114 Matula, 67 F3d at 489–90.
115 Id at 496.
116 Id at 495. Inadequacy, as opposed to futility, has generally been interpreted to
refer to cases in which parents ask for structural, systematic reforms or challenge the
adequacy of the administrative proceedings themselves. This exception would not be applicable here. For a discussion of the scope of the inadequacy exception in IDEA cases,
see Hoeft, 967 F2d at 1309.
117 See A.W. v Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F3d 791, 792–93 (3d Cir 2007) (holding that a § 1983 action was not available to remedy IDEA-created rights, contrary to
Matula).
111
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Batchelor v Rose Tree Media School District118 threw the
Third Circuit’s position into doubt. The case acknowledges that
an exception for unavailable relief “exist[s] generally,” consistent with Matula.119 Yet the court seemingly sides with the
majority of circuits by finding the exception inapplicable “in the
instant case.”120 The Third Circuit curiously gives no treatment
to Matula while still acknowledging that the case remains good
law by citing it for another principle.121 In ignoring that precedent, Batchelor implicitly recharacterizes Matula in a manner
inconsistent with its holding. By contrast, other courts inside
and outside the Third Circuit agree with the proposition that
Matula stands for the principle that, within the Third Circuit,
the plain-language reading of § 1415(l) permits waiving exhaustion when the form of relief is unavailable under the IDEA.122
Because the reliance by other courts on Matula suggests that it
is still good law, district courts in the Third Circuit grappling
with the proper interpretation of § 1415(l) should rely on
Matula.
C.

The Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the question, but its
stance post-Fry is unclear. In Witte v Clark County School
District,123 the court held that “under the plain words of the
statute,” exhaustion is not required when money damages are
sought.124 As in Matula, the Witte court relied on a plainlanguage reading of the IDEA. Witte has not been explicitly
overruled, but a subsequent case, Robb v Bethel School District
# 403,125 distinguished Witte and unmoored the question of exhaustion from relief.126 Yet Robb was overruled by another case,
Payne v Peninsula School District,127 that itself contributed to
118

759 F3d 266 (3d Cir 2014).
Id at 276.
120 See id at 276–78.
121 See id at 280.
122 See James S. v School District of Philadelphia, 559 F Supp 2d 600, 618 (ED Pa
2008) (stating the holding of Matula and noting numerous district courts that had applied that holding). See also Abraham P. v Los Angeles Unified School District, 2017 WL
4839071, *5 (CD Cal); Shadie v Forte, 2011 WL 607447, *5 (MD Pa); L.T. v Mansfield
Township School District, 2007 WL 2332308, *7 (D NJ).
123 197 F3d 1271 (9th Cir 1999).
124 Id at 1275.
125 308 F3d 1047 (9th Cir 2002).
126 Id at 1049–50.
127 653 F3d 863 (9th Cir 2011) (en banc).
119
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the circuit split resolved by Fry. To the extent that the case remains good law, Payne suggests that the Ninth Circuit would
permit the waiver of exhaustion in cases that allege a denial of a
FAPE but seek a form of relief that the IDEA cannot provide.
The facts of Witte are horrific: the plaintiff claimed that
teachers at the defendant school had force-fed him oatmeal
mixed with his own vomit, choked him when he failed to run fast
enough, deprived him of meals, and threatened him with physical harm if he told his mother what was going on, among other
violations.128 The fact that the educational concerns had been
remedied factored into the court’s decision. The plaintiff had
since changed schools and was receiving appropriate educational
services at his new school, a change that had been “facilitated
through the IEP process.”129 Although the parents had never invoked a formal due process hearing, the parents’ satisfaction
with the student’s current educational state of affairs meant
that remedies under the IDEA would be inappropriate for the
harm. The court also noted that the nature of the injuries was
not well suited to remedies under the IDEA.130 The court permitted the suit to proceed without exhaustion.131
The Ninth Circuit stepped back from this position in Robb
and recharacterized Witte without explicitly overruling it.
Money damages, according to the Robb court, were not doing the
work in Witte.132 Rather, what mattered was that the parents
had resolved the student’s educational issues informally and
that the injuries were physical.133
In Payne, the Ninth Circuit promulgated a “relief-centered”
approach to determine when exhaustion was waived under
§ 1415(l), explicitly overruling Robb.134 This decision diverged
from the injury-centered approach of Charlie F. and its kin,
wherein injuries that could be addressed to any degree by the
due process hearing require exhaustion.135 Both approaches are
moot post-Fry, which resolved this very disagreement. But the
Payne court’s holding that the “exhaustion requirement applies
to claims only to the extent that the relief actually sought by the
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Witte, 197 F3d at 1272–73.
Id at 1273–74 & n 1.
Id at 1275–76.
Id at 1276.
Robb, 308 F3d at 1051.
Id at 1051–52.
Payne, 653 F3d at 874.
See Charlie F., 98 F3d at 993.
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plaintiff could have been provided by the IDEA” and its affirmation that Witte was consistent with § 1415(l) likely places the
Ninth Circuit closer to the Third Circuit’s position.136
Payne contains conflicting language about money damages
specifically. The court wrote that “courts should start by looking at a complaint’s prayer for relief and determine whether
the relief sought is also available under the IDEA” and that it
is improper “for courts to assume that money damages will be
directed toward forms of relief that would be available under
IDEA.”137 This language implies that the availability of the relief
should be crucial to the analysis and that courts should not
assume that IDEA relief will suffice in lieu of money damages.
However, the court also asserted that exhaustion cannot be
avoided “merely by limiting a prayer for relief to money damages.”138 The idea that money damages alone are not dispositive is
not inconsistent with the waiver of exhaustion,139 but at least suggests distancing the form of relief from the exhaustion analysis. In
any event, the degree to which Payne is controlling in the Ninth
Circuit is debatable post-Fry, for Fry rejected both the injurycentered and relief-centered approaches.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit is in a state of flux post-Fry, but
given the stated reasoning in Witte and Payne, which are still—
at least in relevant part—good law in the Ninth Circuit, that
court is likely open to holding that exhaustion may be waived in
cases in which the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but seeks
money damages. At least one district court in the Ninth Circuit
has allowed a suit both alleging a denial of a FAPE and asking
for money damages to move forward without exhaustion with
respect to that form of relief, relying on both Fry and Payne to
reach its conclusion.140

136

Payne, 653 F3d at 872, 874. See also Matula, 67 F3d at 495–96.
Payne, 653 F3d at 875, 877. This language, in part, responds to the Seventh
Circuit’s assertion that, without first requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies,
judges cannot know whether parents are seeking money in lieu of another perfectly
appropriate form of relief or whether money would truly be the right relief. Charlie F., 98
F3d at 993.
138 Payne, 653 F3d at 877, quoting Robb, 308 F3d at 1049.
139 To be clear, this Comment does not advocate for a pleading standard. See
Part III.C.5.
140 See A.M. v Fresno Unified School District, 2017 WL 6209389, *9–10 (ED Cal).
See also Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071 at *5 (citing Matula, Payne, and Fry to suggest
that exhaustion should be waived, but reaching its conclusion on other grounds).
137
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D. Other Theories under Which Courts Have Waived
Exhaustion: Past Injury, Physical Injury, and CommonLaw Torts
There are some cases in which courts have waived exhaustion for reasons seemingly unrelated to the plaintiff’s prayer for
a form of relief that the IDEA cannot provide. In those cases,
courts insist that exhaustion was waived for some reason other
than the request for money damages. Explanations include that
the injury was entirely in the past, that the injury was wholly
physical, or that the allegation amounted to a common-law tort.
These cases are worth considering and reanalyzing in the
wake of Fry. If a similar case were to be brought now, post-Fry,
the court’s initial inquiry would have to be whether the plaintiff
alleged a denial of a FAPE. There is an argument that each of
these pre-Fry cases implicates a FAPE and thus would trigger
exhaustion. And because Fry’s holding addressed how to determine when exhaustion applies generally, it presumably did not
render irrelevant these carveouts.141 But if these cases rightly
waived exhaustion, and this Comment argues they did, a new
approach is needed to justify their results in the wake of Fry.
Said differently, if similar cases were to arise again post-Fry,
these precedents create tension with Fry’s gravamen-of-thecomplaint inquiry; this Comment’s solution resolves that tension.
First, in Covington v Knox County School System,142 a school
left a child in a time-out room for many hours at a time.143 The
Sixth Circuit held that merely asking for money damages was
not enough to waive exhaustion, but in “unique circumstances
. . . in which the injured child has already graduated from the
special education school, his injuries are wholly in the past, and
therefore money damages are the only remedy that can make
him whole,” families need not exhaust.144 Under very similar

141 For examples of courts applying the cases discussed in this Section post-Fry, see,
for example, Crochran v Columbus City Schools, 278 F Supp 3d 1013, 1023 (SD Ohio
2017) (permitting a suit to proceed without exhaustion), citing Covington v Knox County
School System, 205 F3d 912 (6th Cir 2000); Carr v Department of Public Instruction,
2018 WL 1033294, *6 (WD Wis), citing Padilla v School District No 1 in City and County
of Denver, 233 F3d 1268 (10th Cir 2000).
142 205 F3d 912 (6th Cir 2000).
143 Id at 913.
144 Id at 917. It is worth noting that the Second Circuit rejected an exemption for
similarly situated parents in Polera. 288 F3d at 489–90 (distinguishing Covington from
Polera on the grounds that the plaintiffs in Polera could have obtained relief before the
student graduated).
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facts, in Padilla v School District No 1 in City and County of
Denver,145 the Tenth Circuit held that exhaustion was waived,
not because of the prayer for damages but because of the “severe
physical, and completely non-educational, injuries” for which the
plaintiff sought redress.146
The explanations in both Covington and Padilla are incoherent, especially post-Fry. Plenty of denials of FAPE are “wholly in
the past,” as in Covington,147 for one reason or another, even for
banal reasons like “the school year ended.”148 Moreover, pursuant to the Fry inquiry, an injury that is entirely physical per the
Padilla court could in fact be related to the denial of a FAPE.
For instance, many IEPs include behavioral intervention plans
that prescribe restraint procedures.149 If a school’s failure to
properly implement those procedures resulted in physical injury,
the nature of the injury nevertheless stemmed from the school’s
failure to properly implement the IEP—a mistake that likely
falls under the denial of a FAPE. In such a case, Fry may suggest exhaustion when Covington or Padilla would not.
Two cases illustrate that courts have waived exhaustion
when they reason that the allegations amounted to state-law
tort claims. In Muskrat v Deer Creek Public Schools,150 the
Muskrats brought an action against their son’s school alleging
several incidents of physical abuse by his teacher and aide as
well as improper use of a time-out room.151 With regard to the
allegations of battery, the court reasoned: “No authority holds
that Congress meant to funnel isolated incidents of common law
torts into the IDEA exhaustion regime.”152 Moore v Kansas City
Public Schools153 held the same under an alarming set of facts.
In that case, a young woman in a special education program in
Missouri was raped at school while unsupervised.154
The common-law-tort explanation falls short because it creates an arbitrary, perhaps even perverse, boundary. “[R]andom
145

233 F3d 1268 (10th Cir 2000).
Id at 1274. Although the court calls the injuries “non-educational,” this characterization is questionable. The school acted in explicit contravention of her IEP, tying
her injury closely to a FAPE. See id at 1271.
147 Covington, 205 F3d at 917.
148 Zdrowski v Rieck, 119 F Supp 3d 643, 668 (ED Mich 2015).
149 See 34 CFR § 300.530(f).
150 715 F3d 775 (10th Cir 2013).
151 Id at 780–81.
152 Id at 785.
153 828 F3d 687 (8th Cir 2016).
154 Id at 690.
146
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violence”155 and “isolated incidents of common law torts”156 do not
require exhaustion, and probably rightly. Yet by that logic, pervasive, repeated, nonrandom violence (which surely would still
be a tort) related to or that stems from a child’s deficient education plan would require extra procedural steps if a court applies
the Fry standard. Unlike the “isolated” and “arbitrary” incidents, in this latter set of cases, the child was denied a FAPE
because of the injury’s educational nature. Applying Fry, then,
in these cases, exhaustion would be required, and the plaintiffs
would need to go through the due process hearing. So post-Fry,
some torts indeed amount to a denial of a FAPE. Yet under
these precedents, one class of torts proceeds straight to court,
while FAPE-centric torts must hurdle an additional procedural
step despite the qualitatively similar nature of the violation.
Because of the unavailability of compensatory or punitive damages under the IDEA, the tortfeasor going through an administrative hearing would not pay via the appropriate form of relief
through this process.157 If “isolated incidents” are properly remedied by compensatory or punitive damages that a court may dole
out, why not (why not especially) nonrandom, FAPE-related
incidents of the same kind? The answer to this question might
be that the IDEA scheme incentivizes families to pursue administrative remedies while the harm is ongoing and redressable;
true enough, but the exhaustion process will intentionally prevent some (if not many) claims of ongoing, repeated FAPErelated educational harm from making it to court. And since
civil litigation is the only means by which the right form of relief
to redress the harm can be allocated, there is little discernible
difference between the claims in Moore and Muskrat and FAPErelated claims of the same kind—if one agrees that both kinds of
injuries are most properly redressed by relief that the IDEA
cannot provide.158 The logic in Moore and Muskrat, then, is untenable post-Fry.
In each of the cases discussed in this Section, there is a
strong intuition that the aggrieved party received the right relief
for the injury incurred. Indeed, all of these cases have shocking
facts. Applying traditional legal principles of relief, one might
155

Muskrat, 715 F3d at 785.
Id.
157 For more discussion of why damages are the appropriate relief for the injuries in
cases like these, see Part III.C.1.
158 See Part III.C.
156
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think that compensatory education or the like could not suffice
to redress the wrong. Yet post-Fry, if the initial inquiry is
whether the complaint alleges a denial of a FAPE, then these
courts may well have reached a different result on the question
of exhaustion. If the court’s starting point was whether the
plaintiff was denied a FAPE, the answer would likely be yes in
most, if not all, of these cases.159 Exhaustion would accordingly
be required. Mandating exhaustion equates to a burdensome
due process hearing; the hearing has benefits, to be sure, but
one consequence is that exhaustion itself can effectively prevent
cases from being litigated in court. In the aggregate, exhaustion
reduces schools’ exposure to compensatory and punitive damages, even if theoretically such relief could be prescribed posthearing. Yet the nature of the injuries in these cases is such that
the relief an IHO could provide is not sufficient redress for the
wrong.160 Sometimes, then, requiring exhaustion effectively prevents the appropriate form of relief from reaching the aggrieved
party, which, this Comment concludes, leads to negative consequences beyond just the affected student.161
As such, exhaustion was rightly waived in these cases, but
not because of the explanations proffered by the courts. Rather,
a more cohesive, textually rooted distinction is needed to explain
why waiving exhaustion was proper in these cases. This Comment
suggests that the form of relief is that distinction. As the following Part describes in detail, when the form of relief demanded is
appropriate yet unavailable under the IDEA, exhaustion should
be waived. This is consistent with the text of the IDEA (“seeking
relief that is also available”)162 and leads to the right outcomes in
each of the above cases.
III. INTERPRETING § 1415(L) TO WAIVE EXHAUSTION
This Comment argues that when a plaintiff alleges a denial
of a FAPE and appropriately demands relief unavailable under
the IDEA, such as compensatory or punitive damages, exhaustion should be waived. This argument is first and foremost

159 For further discussion of what constitutes a denial of a FAPE under Fry, see
Part III.C.3.
160 For an explanation of when compensatory or punitive damages are appropriate
for denials of a FAPE, see Parts III.C.1–2.
161 For a discussion of the inadequate deterrence this scheme would create, see
Part III.C.4.
162 20 USC § 1415(l).
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rooted in the statutory text of § 1415. Moreover, this conclusion is
supported by language in Fry, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation
Act, as well as the legislative history of the IDEA.
Finally, this Comment argues that policy considerations,
which courts often cite in this context, on balance support waiving exhaustion in the small set of cases considered here. In cases
in which this question arises, the facts tend to be particularly
disturbing because the injuries are of the kind for which damages are the appropriate redress. At the same time, requiring exhaustion will necessarily prevent some, if not many, cases from
being litigated in court—the only forum that can provide such
relief. Yet these are the violations that should be deterred the
most. As such, this Comment proposes that reading § 1415(l) to
waive exhaustion when the complaint alleges a denial of a FAPE
but damages are sought more adequately vindicates the rights of
children with disabilities.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

As Justice Kagan wrote in Fry: “We begin, as always, with
the statutory language at issue.”163 The text of § 1415(l) at issue
here reads:
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit
the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal
laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws
seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the
procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted
to the same extent as would be required had the action been
brought under [the IDEA].164
The pertinent phrase is “seeking relief that is also available.” If
a plaintiff is “seeking relief” that is “available” under the IDEA,
then exhaustion is mandated; otherwise, exhaustion is not required. From a cursory plain-language reading like that relied
on by the Matula and Witte courts,165 it would seem that when
relief is unavailable, as in the case in which the relief sought is

163
164
165

Fry, 137 S Ct at 753.
20 USC § 1415(l).
See Matula, 67 F3d at 496; Witte, 197 F3d at 1275.
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something that the IDEA cannot provide, exhaustion is not required. Courts that do not allow relief to bear on exhaustion
have given surprisingly short shrift to this intuitive reading of
§ 1415(l). They have instead relied on policy arguments to justify
exhaustion166 and characterized their conclusion as a “practical
interpretation” of the statute rather than a textual one.167 These
approaches, all but ignoring the plain-language reading, are inconsistent with the tenets of statutory interpretation, which
demand readings to be rooted in the text.168
Although they are often used interchangeably, the use of
“remedy” as opposed to “relief” in this context is important to a
proper reading of § 1415(l). According to the edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary that was current at the time § 1415(l) was added, remedy refers to “[t]he means by which . . . the violation of a
right is prevented, redressed, or compensated.”169 Relief is defined as “[d]eliverance from oppression, wrong, or injustice. In
this sense it is used as a general designation of the assistance,
redress, or benefit which a complainant seeks at the hand of
court.”170 Under these definitions, then, remedy is the process; relief is what the complainant asks for as a result of the process.171
Comparing the language of the IDEA with other federal statutes and regulations confirms this distinction. The Administrative
Procedure Act172 (APA) includes similar language in relation to
relief: “An action in a court of the United States seeking relief
other than money damages . . . shall not be dismissed . . . .”173
The phrase “other than money damages” informs the proper
reading of the IDEA in two ways: first, it places money damages
squarely in the category of relief, and second, it implicitly defines relief as referring to the forms of redress that might be requested. Several federal regulations use relief similarly. 174

166

See, for example, Frazier, 276 F3d at 61.
Polera, 288 F3d at 488.
168 See Fry, 137 S Ct at 753.
169 Black’s Law Dictionary 1163 (West 5th ed 1979).
170 Id at 1161.
171 This distinction is certainly not unique to this Comment. See, for example, 1A
California Jurisprudence § 3.71 at 122–23 (West 3d ed 2014) (stating that a remedy “is
the means by which the action or corresponding obligation is effectuated” and relief “is
the result obtained through the remedy”).
172 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified at 5 USC § 500 et seq.
173 5 USC § 702.
174 See, for example, 49 CFR § 1108.8(a)–(b) (“An arbitrator may grant relief in the
form of monetary damages” but “[n]o injunctive relief shall be available.”); 48 CFR
§ 1803.906(b)(2) (“The complainant may bring a de novo action at law or equity . . . to
167
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Taken together, these laws and regulations demonstrate that
federal rulemakers use relief in reference to those several forms
of benefits or assistance that one might ask for in litigation.
While this may seem obvious, Congress’s consistent use of relief
in this sense shapes the proper reading of the IDEA.
Despite this subtle but important distinction, relief and
remedy are often conflated. But the conflation goes in only one
direction. While “remedy” can be understood to refer to types of
relief,175 the reverse is never true. That is, relief cannot be
properly understood to refer to the process of obtaining redress.176 And § 1415(l) refers to relief, not remedy. Even if the
distinction does not seem compelling generally, the surrounding
clauses make clear that “relief” in this particular statute must
refer to forms of redress. The subsequent clause refers to “procedures,” thereby implicitly distinguishing IDEA procedures from
IDEA relief.177 The statute conditions exhaustion of one (procedures) on the availability of the other (relief).178 From this, the
proper reading of relief here cannot be process; it must refer to
the various kinds of redress a complainant could receive from
the process. In any event, even if Congress did not mean “relief”
in the sense this Comment claims, courts are reluctant to correct
“drafting errors.”179 Holding Congress to the meaning of the
statute encourages precise word usage and removes the courts
from acting as Congress’s interpreter.180
With this interpretation of § 1415(l) as a backdrop, the following sections turn to other statutes and the Fry decision to
lend support to this reading of the provision.

seek compensatory damages and other relief available.”). See also FRCP 8(a)(3) (“A
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”).
175 Even footnote eight of the Fry opinion refers to “remedy.” Fry, 137 S Ct at 754
n 8. The statute, though, refers to “relief.” And in the context of the IDEA, “remedies” is
most frequently used in reference to “administrative remedies”—that is, the procedures,
such as the due process hearing, generally mandated by § 1415(l). See, for example, id
at 757.
176 The APA and federal rules and regulations cited above confirm this. Even if
Congress is not consistent with respect to “remedy,” “relief ” is used only with the connotation of various forms. See text accompanying notes 172–74.
177 20 USC § 1415(l).
178 20 USC § 1415(l).
179 See Lamie v United States Trustee, 540 US 526, 542 (2004) (explaining that it is
beyond the province of the courts to correct Congress’s drafting mistakes).
180 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 381–82 (2005).
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1. The ADA, § 504, and Fry.
Fry resolved a circuit split181 over when exhaustion was
mandated for suits brought under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act
§ 504, but, of course, left this Comment’s subject open. Turning
to the language of those statutes and then to the Fry decision itself nonetheless guides the proper interpretation of § 1415(l).
Before Fry was decided, some argued that the proper resolution of the circuit split that Fry settled was that students who
were double-covered by the ADA or § 504 and the IDEA who
brought a claim based solely on the ADA or § 504 should not
have to exhaust.182 This argument was rooted in the differences
between “the procedures and substantive requirements for the
identification, evaluation, educational placement, and FAPE for
students” under the IDEA, as compared to its sister statutes.183
Of course, the relief available under these statutes is also different. These statutory differences did not play a role in the Fry decision,184 but the reasoning still bears on this question. At the
very least, statutory differences indicate that caution is warranted before uniformly mandating exhaustion without regard
to the individual underlying facts.
Turning to Fry, although the Court did not explicitly answer
this question, the reasoning of the case nonetheless supports
this Comment’s conclusion. Language in Fry implies that exhaustion is contingent on what an IHO can provide. The Court
reasoned that exhaustion would be waived if “[a] hearing officer
. . . would have to send [a plaintiff] away empty-handed.”185 And
an IHO would certainly have to turn a parent away empty
handed if that parent requested the kinds of relief that an IHO

181

Compare generally Payne, 653 F3d 863, with Charlie F., 98 F3d 989.
See generally Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 Conn
L Rev 259 (2011).
183 Id at 286.
184 The Frys did not include arguments about ADA or § 504 remedies in their brief,
but some amici did. See, for example, Brief Amicus Curiae for the Council of Parent
Attorneys and Advocates and Advocates for Children of New York in Support of Petitioners, Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, Docket No 15-497, *9–15 (US filed Aug 29,
2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4547900) (arguing that the differences between
the ADA, § 504, and the IDEA—particularly Congress’s choice not to impose an exhaustion requirement for the ADA and § 504—supported waiver).
185 Fry, 137 S Ct at 754.
182
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was not able to give.186 The Fry Court recognized, then, that the
limits of an IHO’s authority interplay with the proper reading of
what “relief” is “available.”
Such a reading is not in tension with the core holding in Fry
that the only category of “relief” the IDEA makes “available” is
relief for the denial of a FAPE. That holding describes only what
an IHO can give relief for, but an IHO is also constrained by the
form that relief will take. The Court also characterized its holding as “establish[ing] the scope of § 1415(l)” by identifying “the
circumstances in which the IDEA enables a person to obtain redress (or, similarly, to access a benefit).”187 If relief for a denial of
a FAPE represents one dimension of that scope, then the kinds
of relief available represent another dimension. Both define the
circumstances in which a parent can access the appropriate redress for the injury of a disabled child, and both can be baked
into the statutory language of “relief that is also available.” To
ignore the availability of a form of relief, the plainest reading of
the statute, is to contort the IDEA in a way that is inconsistent
with the principles of statutory interpretation.
Because Fry left footnotes four and eight open for debate,
courts answering this question must turn once again to interpreting § 1415(l). Properly interpreting the IDEA hinges on
reading relief as taking a certain form: for example, relief in the
form of damages or relief in the form of an injunction. Courts
reading § 1415(l), however, have often ignored the form of relief
and focused only on what relief is for. For example, in Charlie F.,
the Seventh Circuit read the statute to mean “relief for the
events, condition, or consequences of which the person complains.”188 This is an unnatural reading of “seeking relief that is
also available.” As Fry explained, what the relief is for is only
part of the picture; it is the scope of the relief, but not the relief itself.189 For the statute refers directly to “relief,” and the

186 As noted in footnote four of Fry, the solicitor general also agrees with this plainlanguage interpretation. Id at 752 n 4. The amicus brief argued for a holding in Fry that
exempted the Frys from the exhaustion requirement because of their prayer for compensatory damages. Solicitor General Brief at *16 (cited in note 95). Of course, that was not
the outcome, but the argument still bears on this question.
187 Fry, 137 S Ct at 753.
188 Charlie F., 98 F3d at 992. Other courts on this side of the split reasoned similarly.
See, for example, Cudjoe, 297 F3d at 1067 (“The IDEA offers redress whose ‘genesis and
manifestation . . . are educational.’”), quoting Charlie F., 98 F3d at 993.
189 See Fry, 137 S Ct at 753–54.
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plainest reading of § 1415(l) focuses on the form of relief being
sought.
The Charlie F. court reasoned that if the administrative
process could provide some relief, it should be exhausted.190 And
though Fry rejected that inquiry for exhaustion generally, it
would still be relevant in a case in which the relief sought was
unavailable under the IDEA. Presumably courts that follow the
Charlie F. approach would apply their in-circuit precedent for
approaching the question of exhaustion after concluding that the
plaintiff alleged a denial of a FAPE under Fry. Indeed, this was
the Eighth Circuit’s approach in J.M., the only post-Fry case to
confront this question.
As J.M. demonstrates, though, reconciling Fry with the reasoning of the circuits on the Charlie F. side of the split would result in a catch-22 for plaintiffs. In J.M., the court acknowledged
that Fry left this question open, but maintained that asking for
relief that the IDEA cannot provide does not waive exhaustion.191 In the court’s view, that the parent had voluntarily
removed the student from school, removing compensatory education as a viable option, did not “exempt her from the exhaustion requirement.”192 Facially, this seems sensible; plaintiffs
should not manufacture situations to obtain a certain form of relief. But if parents need to pull their students from school for
legitimate reasons,193 they cannot immediately file a civil suit
under J.M., nor will any relief that an IHO can give be effective,
because the child is no longer in school to receive compensatory
education. The result is that the parent must keep the child in
the problematic educational placement if they want any relief
at all.
This particular result stems from the facts of J.M. but represents the incongruence of Fry with J.M. and its ilk. Courts
that would not permit exhaustion for denials of a FAPE when
unavailable relief is the appropriate relief create a situation in
which the plaintiff must settle for relief that does not actually
redress her injury or get no relief at all. This status quo is in
190

Charlie F., 98 F3d at 992.
J.M., 850 F3d at 950 (“[T]he IDEA’s exhaustion requirement remains the general
rule, regardless of whether the administrative process offers the particular type of relief
that is being sought.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
192 Id.
193 Legitimate reasons might include safety concerns. As Part III.C.2 discusses, violations of the sort in which damages are the appropriate remedy often involve physical
injuries, as the facts of Abraham P. illustrate. See note 1 and accompanying text.
191
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tension with Fry’s reasoning that exhaustion should not be
mandated when an IHO “would have to send [a plaintiff] away
empty-handed.”194
2. Distinguishing the IDEA and relief from the PLRA and
remedy.
The IDEA stands in contrast with the Prison Litigation
Reform Act195 (PLRA). Courts’ interpretations of the PLRA can
help inform the terms of the IDEA exhaustion requirement because the language of the statutes are facially similar. But
courts have generally read the PLRA to almost always mandate
exhaustion, and as such, courts sometimes invoke the PLRA to
defend exhaustion under the IDEA.196 The exhaustion clause of
the IDEA, however, can be distinguished from the PLRA based
on its precise word choice and construction. Indeed, the PLRA’s
language confirms that Congress could have required exhaustion under the IDEA without concern for the availability of the
relief sought, but chose not to in § 1415(l).
The PLRA contains language unequivocally mandating exhaustion: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”197 The language of the PLRA is clearly stronger than
the IDEA’s § 1415(l). While the PLRA in 41 USC § 1997e creates
an affirmative mandate to exhaust, the IDEA is written conditionally: prisoners must first go through the administrative processes, whereas students need exhaust only if relief is available.
This distinction, while admittedly formalistic, implies a level of
flexibility baked into the IDEA.
Beyond this formal distinction, case law surrounding the
last clause of 42 USC § 1997e(a)—“until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted”—aids in the proper
interpretation of the IDEA’s similar use of “available.” In Ross v
Blake,198 the Court reiterated that “available” means “‘capable of
use for the accomplishment of a purpose,’ and that which ‘is
194

Fry, 137 S Ct at 754.
Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321-066 (1996), codified as amended at 18 USC § 3626.
196 See, for example, Frazier, 276 F3d at 61–62 (analogizing PLRA exhaustion to
IDEA exhaustion).
197 42 USC § 1997e(a).
198 136 S Ct 1850 (2016).
195
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accessible or may be obtained.’”199 The Court elaborated that
unavailability includes a situation in which pursuing the administrative process would be a “dead end” because officers are unable
to provide the requested relief.200 This analysis maps nicely onto
the IDEA. For parents seeking monetary relief, pursuing a due
process hearing, wherein IHOs simply cannot grant the relief
they seek, would be a dead end—and thus relief is by definition
unavailable.
But some cases have cited another PLRA case, Booth v
Churner,201 which mandated stringent restrictions on waiving
exhaustion, to justify a reading of the IDEA that mandates exhaustion even when the requested relief is unavailable.202 Booth,
like Ross, interpreted the exhaustion language in the PLRA:
“until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”203 In that case, the plaintiff requested money damages,
which were not available in the administrative process. The
court held that the availability of the relief sought was not relevant. Exhaustion was required notwithstanding the availability
of compensatory damages or other types of relief. While this
holding may seem to preclude an exception to IDEA exhaustion
for compensatory relief, the PLRA and its reading in Booth are
distinguishable from the IDEA in essential ways.
Crucially, the PLRA refers to “remedy,” not “relief.” Again,
remedy here should be understood to refer to the process; relief
refers to the redress that comes from that process.204 The difference is subtle but important, and the construction of the PLRA
confirms the distinction. The precursor to the PLRA, the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act205 (CRIPA), required exhaustion only if a “plain, speedy, and effective” remedy was
available.206 “Plain” and “speedy” are descriptors of a process, not
of a form of assistance. Moreover, Ross implicitly confirms this
difference by referring to the prison grievance process itself as
the “available remed[y]” in question—as opposed to the money
or institutional change that the plaintiff hoped to get out of the

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id at 1858–59, quoting Booth v Churner, 532 US 731, 737–38 (2001).
Ross, 136 S Ct at 1859.
532 US 731 (2001).
See, for example, Frazier, 276 F3d at 61–62.
42 USC § 1997e(a).
See text accompanying notes 163–80.
Pub L No 96-247, 94 Stat 349 (1980).
CRIPA § 7(a)(1), 94 Stat at 352.
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process.207 Remedy, then, is understood to refer to the “mechanism [ ] to provide relief” as distinct from the relief itself.208
Other case law supports this distinction, and, by extension, a
definition of relief grounded in the type or form of redress
sought, as opposed to the process or what the relief is for.209
Booth, then, is not only reconcilable with this Comment’s
reading of § 1415(l) but demonstrates that precise word choice
can guide statutory interpretation. The logic of Booth’s holding
rested on reading the statute as mandating exhaustion of the
available procedures. This reading was supported by the construction of the sentence (the verb “exhausted” modified “remedy”) and
by the dictionary definitions.210 Applied to the IDEA, the remedies
available would include the due process hearing as established
by state education agencies. If the statute were phrased like the
PLRA, a parent would have to engage with state procedures if
the state provided an infrastructure for a due process hearing;
the only applicable exceptions would be those laid out in Ross.
But the statute is not phrased as such. The term “exhausted”
does not modify “relief,” it modifies “procedures”; “available”
modifies “relief.” And the relief available under the IDEA’s procedures is a different matter entirely from the procedures available; compensatory damages are decidedly not included in the
former category. The PLRA demonstrates that Congress can and
does deploy language creating an unequivocal exhaustion mandate. Congress did not do so in § 1415(l), instead linking exhaustion to the relief sought.
B.

Legislative History

Not only is the conclusion that exhaustion should be waived
when the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but seeks unavailable relief firmly rooted in the statutory text, it is consistent

207

See Ross, 136 S Ct at 1858–60 (quotation marks omitted).
Id at 1859. Even if one uses “remedy” as synonymous with “relief,” which, as
noted in this Comment and in Booth, is not uncommon, the opposite is not acceptable. As
explained in Part III.A, “relief ” is not used to refer to procedure in the same way that
“remedy” might be used to refer to the kinds of redress sought. Moreover, as this paragraph describes, the context of “remedy” in the PLRA makes clear that it is not synonymous with “relief ” in the IDEA.
209 See Coleman v Wilson, 933 F Supp 954, 957 (ED Cal 1996) (explaining that the
definition of relief “focus[es] on the ultimate legal form of remedy rather than the means
of achieving the remedy”). See also Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v Sheriff of Suffolk
County, 952 F Supp 869, 879 (D Mass 1997) (“Relief is thus defined as a type of remedy.”).
210 See Booth, 532 US at 738–39.
208
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with the purpose of the IDEA. In hearings for the EHA, Senator
Harrison Williams emphasized that exhaustion was not an unequivocal mandate: “I want to underscore that exhaustion of the
administrative procedures established under this part should
not be required for any individual complainant filing a judicial
action in cases where such exhaustion would be futile either as a
legal or practical matter.”211 Allowing relief in the form of damages in these cases promotes the goal of accountability as the
lawmakers who passed EHA intended and, moreover, constitutes a case in which futility would be practically and legally
futile.
A decade later, Congress explicitly enacted § 1415(l) as a
direct response to Smith.212 The legislative history of that
amendment also points to this exception to the exhaustion rules.
Representative George Miller, one of the original coauthors of
the EHA, stated at the time that “there are certain situations in
which it is not appropriate to require the exhaustion of EHA
remedies before filing a civil law suit,” including when “the hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought.”213 Note
that Miller implicitly distinguished between relief and remedy
here, consistent with the discussion in Part III.A.1. He then
noted that “[t]oday’s bill addresses all of these concerns,” implying that § 1415(l) as written encapsulates those exceptions.214
Taken together, these pieces of legislative history from the
EHA’s original enactment and the passage of § 1415(l) support
an exemption for plaintiffs alleging a denial of a FAPE but requesting damages. There are no indications that Congress intended courts to deviate from the plain-language reading of the
statute (the interpretation utilized by the Matula court), and indeed, there is evidence from Miller’s statements that Congress
very much intended for the prayer for relief to have at least
some controlling effect on the propriety of exhaustion.215
211

S 6, 94th Cong, 1st Sess, in 121 Cong Rec 37416 (Nov 19, 1975).
HR 1523, 99th Cong, 1st Sess, in 131 Cong Rec 31376 (Nov 12, 1985) (“We all
want to see the decision in Smith versus Robinson overturned.”).
213 Id.
214 Id at 31377.
215 Some disfavor legislative history as a tool of construction. See, for example,
District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570, 589–90 & n 12 (rejecting the dissent’s legislativehistory-based interpretation of the Second Amendment); Lawson v FMR, 134 S Ct 1158,
1176–77 (2014) (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e are a
government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than
by what it intended.”). See also Nelson, 91 Va L Rev at 362 (cited in note 180). But it still
lends support to the reading of the statute, at least corroborating the textualist approach
212
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Policy

As a matter of policy, exhaustion should be waived in the
set of cases in which money damages are the appropriate form of
relief but the complaint nevertheless alleges a denial of a FAPE.
First, an analysis of the gravamen-of-the-complaint standard
established by Fry is warranted in order to understand the circumstances that will give rise to such a case. Such cases are uncommon, as this Section explains, yet when they arise, the facts
are such that justice is not served by mere IDEA relief. The
analysis unfolds in three Sections: First, Part III.C.1 addresses
when non-IDEA relief is appropriate by applying long-standing
legal principles of relief. Next, Part III.C.2 applies the Fry
standard to unpack when a set of facts alleges a denial of a
FAPE. Part III.C.3 then synthesizes the first two Sections by
discussing when a complaint both alleges a denial of a FAPE
and when the injury calls for compensatory or punitive damages;
these are the cases in which this Section’s question arises.
Finally, this Comment concludes by discussing the policy
implications for waiving exhaustion in this set of cases.
Part III.C.4 addresses the deterrence value of waiving exhaustion in these cases, while Part III.C.5 confronts the merits of the
due process hearing.
1. When non-IDEA relief would be appropriate.
Cases in which compensatory damages are appropriate relief,
rather than compensatory education, tuition repayment, or injunctive relief, involve harm beyond the typical denial of a
FAPE. In IDEA cases, as in all civil litigation, courts are concerned with granting relief that will appropriately redress the
violation.216 In most cases, supplemental services or other typical
IDEA remedies that an IHO is empowered to give will sufficiently redress the injury. If a school fails to provide the correct
IEP-mandated accommodations in, say, math class, the resulting lack of appropriate progress is remediable by additional
compensatory education services. If the parent unilaterally
of Part III.A. See Digital Reality Trust v Somers, 138 S Ct 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor
concurring) (“Legislative history is of course not the law, but that does not mean it
cannot aid us in our understanding of a law.”).
216 D.F. v Collingswood Borough Board of Education, 694 F3d 488, 498–99 (3d Cir
2012) (“In each case, a court will evaluate the specific type of relief that is appropriate to
ensure that a student is fully compensated for a school district’s past violations of his or
her rights under the IDEA.”) (quotation marks omitted).
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transfers the child to a private school because of a deficient
public-school program, tuition reimbursement suits the injury
well. Thus, the injury needs to be above and beyond the typical
for this question to arise.
This assertion is rooted in the well-established legal principle that the purpose of relief for a wrong is to make the plaintiff
whole, and compensatory damages in particular are well suited
for injuries for which the plaintiff has suffered pain or emotional
distress.217 These are attendant results of all denials of a FAPE
to some extent, but in most cases, the plaintiff can be made more
or less whole through forms of IDEA relief that redress educational injuries.218 Sometimes, though, the physical or mental
pain, suffering, and emotional distress of the FAPE denial are
more than de minimis, so much so as to justify compensatory
damages.219 Part II.D demonstrates that such cases exist, and
courts have carved out exceptions that effectively allow for compensatory damages by waiving exhaustion. But as that Section
discussed, those cases create tension with Fry.
The law of punitive damages similarly limits their application to a particular class of cases: they are appropriate only
when the offending conduct rises far beyond the acceptable.220

217

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903, comment a (1965):

[Compensatory damages] give to the injured person some pecuniary return for
what he has suffered or is likely to suffer. There is no scale by which the detriment caused by suffering can be measured and hence there can be only a very
rough correspondence between the amount awarded as damages and the extent
of the suffering.
See also, for example, Albemarle Paper Company v Moody, 422 US 405, 418 (1975) (explaining that relief for employment discrimination claims should “make the person[ ]
whole for injuries suffered”).
218 See Burlington, 471 US at 370–71 (concluding that tuition repayment is appropriate relief for some IDEA claims because it requires schools “to belatedly pay expenses
that [they] should have paid all along”); Boose, 786 F3d at 1056 (describing compensatory education’s role as making up for past deficiencies in a child’s educational program
and undoing damage done by prior violations).
219 See Sellers v School Board of the City of Manassas, 141 F3d 524, 527 (4th Cir
1998) (suggesting that compensatory and punitive damages under the IDEA would
amount to relief for “pain and suffering, emotional distress, and other consequential
damages caused by” the denial of a FAPE). While Sellers denied that this kind of relief
was available under the IDEA, compensatory and punitive damages are available under
the IDEA’s sister statutes and the Constitution. The court’s language is instructive as to
when such relief is appropriate: when the injury at issue prompts pain, suffering, and
emotional distress.
220 See Exxon Shipping Co v Baker, 554 US 471, 491–95 (2008) (discussing the historical justifications for punitive damages and modern standards for the degree of culpability required for their award).
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Awards of punitive damages seek to deter particularly harmful
and blameworthy conduct in addition to their retributive function.221 Determining when to award punitive damages, then, is
in some ways easier than determining when to award compensatory damages because the conduct at issue must be particularly
egregious.222
Based on these legal principles, the injury must implicate
more than educational benefits for compensatory and punitive
damages—both of which are unavailable under the IDEA—to be
the appropriate form of relief for a denial of a FAPE. The injury
must result in material distress, physical or emotional, or result
from the conduct of highly culpable actors.
2. Allegations of a denial of a FAPE under Fry.
In addition to alleging a pattern of facts for which the unavailable relief is appropriate, under Fry, the complaint must
substantively allege a denial of a FAPE. In Fry, Justice Kagan
offers several “clues” for determining whether the gravamen of
the complaint alleges a denial of a FAPE.223 First, could the
plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if it occurred
in a different public space—“say, a public theater or library?”224
Along the same lines, could an adult at the school have brought
the same claim?225 Although these questions are merely guideposts, if the answer to both of these questions is “yes,” then the
claim likely does not allege a denial of a FAPE.226 As discussed
in Part I.C, in Fry, these questions applied neatly to the facts at
hand: had E.F. been denied entry to a library with her goldendoodle, Wonder, or had a teacher in the school been denied entry,

221 Id. For a recent brief overview of when courts find that punitive damages are
appropriate, see Roseanna Summers, Comment, The Psychology of Punishment and the
Puzzle of Why Tortfeasor Death Defeats Liability for Punitive Damages, 124 Yale L J
1295, 1295 (2015) (“[Punitive damages serve] two main purposes: (1) punishing outrageous conduct and (2) deterring its future occurrence.”).
222 Under state law, states differ as to the precise standard required to justify punitive damages. But all agree that it is some heightened level of culpability. See, for example, Peterson v Travelers Indemnity Co, 867 F3d 992, 995 (8th Cir 2017) (“South Dakota
allows punitive damages if malice exists.”); Parker v Four Seasons Hotel, Ltd, 845 F3d
807, 812–13 (7th Cir 2017) (explaining that Illinois law distinguishes between mere negligent behavior and fraudulent, malicious, or violent behavior for purposes of awarding
punitive damages).
223 Fry, 137 S Ct at 756.
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 See id.
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a discrimination claim would be equally available. And these
questions might well prove useful when, as in Fry, an element of
physical access is the problem. They prove less straightforward
under other sets of facts.
Not many lower courts have grappled with applying these
questions to other fact patterns as of yet. But cases that have
done so make it evident that the utility of the suggested inquiries decreases as the injuries become more uniquely school related.227 It can be difficult for courts to determine whether a
child’s injury would be cognizable had it occurred in another
public sphere because public officials outside of the school setting do not possess the same level of close relation with, responsibility for, and knowledge of children with disabilities. Moreover, when cases allege a denial of a FAPE, the injury must be
related to the educational benefits to which students are entitled.228 An injury implicating the student’s IEP (an educational
benefit to which the student is entitled) at least suggests a denial of a FAPE, yet the questions Fry leaves lower courts to work
with might point the other way. Disentangling the injury from
the educational setting, then, can yield conflicting, even irrational, results.229
If past cases that waived exhaustion were to come out the
same way post-Fry, those plaintiffs could not allege a FAPE denial. But analysis of the facts of these cases shows that a FAPE
is likely implicated. For instance, applying the “clues” to the
facts of Witte,230 could the plaintiff have brought the same case if
he had been force-fed oatmeal by a librarian in a public library?
227 See, for example, J.S., III v Houston County Board of Education, 877 F3d 979,
986 (11th Cir 2017) (explaining that the cause of action in question “does not fit neatly
into Fry’s hypotheticals” and could conceivably fit under both a denial of a FAPE and
intentional discrimination under the ADA). See also Fry, 137 S Ct at 759 (Alito concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (cautioning against the use of the majority’s
clues because of the overlap between the relief available under the IDEA, the ADA,
and § 504).
228 See Endrew F., 137 S Ct at 996–97, citing Rowley, 458 US at 207.
229 For an illustration of this tension in post-Fry cases, compare Abraham P. v Los
Angeles Unified School District, 2017 WL 4839071, *4 (CD Cal) (determining that the
plaintiff was not alleging a denial of a FAPE because he claimed he was placed in a segregated setting at school, and he “could theoretically raise a similar argument if he was
placed in a segregated setting at a theater”), with Parrish v Bentonville School District,
2017 WL 1086198, *30 (WD Ark) (conceding that a plaintiff could be “segregated” in a
public space like a library or theater and have a cognizable claim, but because the segregation occurred in a special education classroom, a uniquely educational feature, the allegation amounted to a denial of a FAPE).
230 See text accompanying notes 123–31.
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Yes; but librarians, unlike teachers and school administrators,
are not responsible for discipline or for overseeing a mealtime—
such a situation would simply never arise. Similarly, could a
teacher have brought the same claim as the child in Witte?
Again, yes; but it would be absurd to imagine a principal reprimanding an adult teacher by demanding that she eat oatmeal.
Just asking the suggested questions here feels bizarre given
that these facts would not arise elsewhere; yet this is what Fry
left lower courts to work with.231 Because this example comes
from a real case, a similar fact pattern could reoccur. Courts
would have to confront facts like these in the wake of Fry no
matter how far removed they seem from the paradigmatic examples posed in that case.232 And it seems overly formalistic to
assert that these claims are unrelated to a FAPE simply because, in some alternate universe in which librarians and theater tellers are responsible for the well-being of a child for eight
hours (or more) a day, they could have occurred in another public sphere. Ultimately, these facts simply would never happen
but for school faculty’s and staff’s unique positions in the child’s
life—as disciplinarians, protectors, educators, counselors, and
monitors.
Covington provides another example of a case in which trying to reconcile the result of the case (waiver of exhaustion) with
the Fry standard (whether the plaintiffs alleged a denial of a
FAPE) proves incongruous. In that case, Jason Covington, a
child with mental and emotional disabilities, was disciplined by
his teacher in the form of a “vault-like” time-out room.233 Jason
was locked in the time-out room for long stretches of time
and, on one occasion, had to relieve himself on the floor.234 The

231 One post-Fry case applied these questions to a case concerning a student’s toileting needs, demonstrating the bizarreness that some relatively common educational scenarios yield when applied to other public facilities or to comparably situated adults.
Sophie G. v Wilson County Schools, 265 F Supp 3d 765, 771 (MD Tenn 2017).
232 The Court used two examples. First, it cited a wheelchair-bound student seeking
access to the building; then, it compared that to a child alleging that the school failed to
provide remedial math tutoring. The former example did not allege a denial of a FAPE;
the latter did. Fry, 137 S Ct at 756–57. Clearly Witte, see text accompanying notes 123–
31, and Covington, see text accompanying notes 142–46, 233–36, do not map nicely onto
either set of facts, but they are also not fanciful or fictional. Courts determining whether
students under similar scenarios alleged a denial of a FAPE face a challenge, then,
applying Fry to scenarios in which the injury intertwines with the student’s educational plan.
233 Covington, 205 F3d at 913.
234 Id at 913–14.
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time-out room was a form of discipline contemplated by Jason’s
IEP, although obviously not as implemented.235 The Sixth Circuit
waived exhaustion but only because Jason had since graduated;
the court reasoned that the harm was entirely retrospective and
thus exhaustion was unnecessary.236
Now, applying the questions from Fry, what if Jason had
been segregated in a similar fashion in a public theater? Would
an adult in the building likewise have a claim? The answer to
both must be yes. But like Witte, such a situation would never
arise because theater attendants do not discipline patrons, nor
do adults go to time-out. The uniquely educational nature of the
injury must weigh toward the conclusion that Jason was denied
a FAPE. And under Fry, that would indicate that exhaustion is
mandated; yet the court pre-Fry waived exhaustion.237
This discussion goes to show that recharacterizing cases like
Covington and Witte as non-FAPE cases based on the questions
posed by Fry in order to reconcile their results—that is, that exhaustion was waived—is not tenable. That kind of characterization divorces the events from their uniquely educational context.238 Grappling with what constitutes a denial of a FAPE
under the Fry standard thereby reveals the ambiguities of the
Fry standard. Witte and Covington do, at least arguably, allege a
denial of a FAPE, which post-Fry would trigger exhaustion, a
different result than those courts reached. The following Section
argues that these cases are the kind in which damages were the
correct, appropriate relief, and as such, both cases properly
waived exhaustion when they were decided. Fry might seem to
compel another result today, but because it left open the question, another solution—the interpretation of § 1415(l) proposed
by this Comment—is possible.

235

Id at 914.
Id at 917.
237 Courts have come out differently post-Fry on this very issue (segregation), including in young Abraham’s case. See Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071 at *4 (determining
that the plaintiff was not alleging a denial of FAPE because he claimed he was placed in
a segregated setting at school, and he “could theoretically raise a similar argument if he
was placed in a segregated setting at a theater”).
238 In any event, the cases at issue here are few and far between. The infrequency of
such cases alone should go a long way to quell the fears of critics that this would create a
pleading standard by which parents could circumvent exhaustion.
236
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3. The most egregious violations: cases in which
compensatory damages are appropriate and a denial of a
FAPE is alleged.
Parts III.C.1–2 show that in order for the question at the
heart of this Comment to arise, three conditions must be satisfied: the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE, the plaintiff seeks a
prayer for relief unavailable under the IDEA, and, crucially, the
desired relief must be the appropriate relief. The last condition
is relatively rare in FAPE cases. Damages are appropriate only
for the kinds of injuries that go beyond typical educational
wrongs, such as injuries involving physical harm or severe emotional distress.239 But though they are rare, past cases such as
Covington and Witte demonstrate that these kinds of facts do
exist.
Turning back once more to Covington, assume that Jason
had not graduated at the time of the lawsuit and that he was
still a public-school student with the other underlying facts remaining the same. As to the question of relief, compensatory education under the IDEA can help compensate Jason for the lost
learning time and maybe even help get him therapeutic services
going forward; an injunction under the IDEA might prevent the
misuse of the time-out room as applied to other students in the
future, but can any form of relief available under the IDEA compensate for the emotional distress and physical and psychological trauma caused by Jason’s time in a small, dark room? Indeed, traditional doctrine tells us that compensatory damages
are the proper relief for such an injury,240 and such relief is unavailable under the IDEA.241 But because he has at least arguably alleged a denial of a FAPE,242 Fry would first compel the
“ponderous” exhaustion process through a forum that cannot
provide the appropriate relief.243
A potentially interesting and increasingly relevant set of
cases in which this might arise involves in-school arrests. When
a teacher calls the police for behavior that is a manifestation of a
239 See Part III.C.1. E.F. and her family sought damages for emotional distress in
Fry itself. See Fry, 137 S Ct at 752.
240 See, for example, Witte, 197 F3d at 1276 (“The remedies available under the
IDEA would not appear to be well suited to addressing past physical injuries adequately;
such injuries typically are remedied through an award of monetary damages.”).
241 See Charlie F., 98 F3d at 991 (finding that money damages are not available as
relief under the IDEA).
242 See Part III.C.2.
243 Burlington, 471 US at 370.

2018]

Vindication for Students with Disabilities

1029

student’s disability, lifelong consequences can ensue for that
student—the physical and emotional trauma of an arrest, a
black mark on their educational record, and potentially even
criminal proceedings.244 This wrong might arguably fall outside
of a denial of a FAPE (a student could surely be arrested in a
library or a public theater). But there is a strong case to be made
that this form of discrimination would never happen in a library
or a public theater: teachers are uniquely situated to know
about a student’s disability, particularly when it is invisible, and
uniquely responsible for implementing the de-escalation strategies mandated by the IEP—which should not include resorting
to the juvenile justice system. For instance, if a child with an
emotional disability has a history of throwing chairs, his IEP
will almost surely mandate a particular adult response when
this behavior occurs. If the child throws a chair and the teacher
instead calls the police, then she has ignored the IEP, which
would be a uniquely educational injury and likely a denial of a
FAPE. Unlike the teacher, a librarian could not know of the
child’s disability nor would it be her responsibility to react differently than she would with any other person behaving similarly. In a case in which a disabled student is arrested in contravention of his IEP, compensatory education could account for
the lost learning time but not for the emotional and physical
trauma of being shunted into the criminal justice system because of his disability by the educators charged with helping
him succeed.245
In sum, this discussion serves to highlight that there are indeed cases that are FAPE-centric under the Fry test for which
damages are the most appropriate relief. When such a case arises,
the facts tend to be appalling: they implicate pain, suffering, and

244 For a discussion of the consequences of in-school interaction with the criminal
justice system, see Michelle Mbekeani-Wiley, Handcuffs in Hallways: The State of Policing in Chicago Public Schools *17–18 (Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law,
Feb 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/RBK7-RVS5.
245 This argument has been raised, albeit rarely. See J.E.B. v Independent School
District No. 720, 2007 WL 1544611, *4 (D Minn). The court did not reach the merits of
whether the in-school arrests constituted a denial of a FAPE in that case because litigation occurred after a full due process hearing. Not only did the district court defer to the
IHO’s judgment that a FAPE was not denied without much further analysis, but because
the case predated Endrew F., the Eighth Circuit’s FAPE standard was lower (only
“some” as opposed to “no educational benefit”). Id. See also Garcia v City of McAllen,
2013 WL 6589426, *5 (SD Tex) (determining, pre-Fry, that a claim for false arrest was
not brought under the IDEA when the plaintiffs also did not argue that the arrest
amounted to a denial of a FAPE).
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emotional distress that compensatory education or the like cannot completely redress.246 This question appears not in the typical IDEA cases, which are redressable with well-established
IDEA forms of relief, but instead in cases in which it is clear
that compensatory education or similar compensation will not
suffice to right the wrong.
4. Policy implications for waiving exhaustion.
The IDEA statutory scheme was designed to remedy the injustice of special education students languishing in classrooms:
“3.9 million children are waiting for the fundamental equal educational opportunities on which our Nation is based. This is not
right.”247 Insisting on exhaustion will systematically underdeter
schools from gross misconduct that is remediable in these types
of cases.248 Exhaustion, by design, functions as a filtration system.249 Parents must endure a due process hearing—and in some
states, mediation before or an appeal after—before filing in
court. These steps are not merely red tape; a due process hearing, while easier and more accessible than a civil suit, still requires evidence gathering, written briefs, and witnesses. Even if
the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the hearing costs time and money.
All the while, the IHO lacks the authority to provide the relief
sought, which in some cases will be the most appropriate relief.
As a result, one can infer that many families are simply not getting their day in court.250 As a coalition of disability advocates
wrote in support of the Frys: “Justice is not merely delayed for
those children; the spectre of months or years of costly and categorically futile proceedings before being allowed to seek the relief they plainly possess under civil rights laws deters many
from seeking justice in the first place.”251 While neither requiring

246

See Part III.C.1.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Hearings on S 6 before the
Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
94th Cong, 1st Sess 1–2 (1975) (statement of Sen Randolph).
248 See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L J 656, 663
(1975) (describing the fault system’s reliance on, with some limitations, “deterrence . . .
as to what behavior is worthwhile”).
249 See Wasserman, 29 J Natl Assoc Admin L Judiciary at 360–61 (cited in note 63).
250 See Enid Campbell, Judicial Review and Appeals as Alternative Remedies, 9
Monash U L Rev 14, 53 (1982) (“[T]he cost of litigating is [ ] a deterrent to many persons
with justiciable grievances.”).
251 Brief of National Disability Rights Network, Disability Rights New York, Equip for
Equality, and Autistic Self Advocacy Network as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
247
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nor waiving exhaustion changes the school’s potential exposure
to damages, the additional process does, in reality, prevent at
least some, if not many, damages cases from making it to federal
court. By extension, schools, school districts, and state education
agencies are not always held accountable to the fullest extent (or
at all). This gap creates underdeterrence against the kinds of extreme misconduct that led to these types of claims.252
Of course, this is fundamentally an empirical claim, and one
for which the limited data provide tentative support. The available data show that some jurisdictions field several thousands of
IDEA complaints each year (totaling annually, on average, more
than 17,000 complaints nationwide).253 Only a small portion,
nearly 3,000 nationwide, lead to adjudication in a due process
hearing each year.254 Although that is a relatively small proportion of complaints, even fewer claims go to court. The data on
judicial decisions of IDEA claims are even more limited, but
suggest that only a small portion of those adjudications proceed
to court—about 124 per year.255 Inferences from these data are
admittedly limited in many ways. For one, the data fail to count
unreported cases, suggesting underinclusion; for another, they
do not reflect cases that preemptively moved straight to court
without exhausting, suggesting overinclusion. Moreover, they
say nothing of the motivations of plaintiffs who choose to continue beyond the due process hearing, nor, for that matter, of
those who choose not to. But these studies at least provide some
baseline empirical data for the volume of special education complaints that do not see a forum that can provide damages.
Fry v Napoleon Community Schools, Docket No 15-497, *4 (US filed Aug 29, 2016)
(available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 4524541).
252 See Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv L Rev 1133,
1218 (1977) (explaining that in the analogous—and sometimes identical, when IDEA
cases arise under this statute—§ 1983 context that damage remedies can be viewed “as a
means of deterring injurious conduct” and that “[d]amage remedies imposed on governmental entities could serve to prevent injuries to individuals by the system as a whole”).
See also generally Calabresi, 84 Yale L J 656 (cited in note 248) (explaining how the tort
system promotes optimal deterrence by making those who have committed violations pay
damages).
253 Perry A. Zirkel, Longitudinal Trends in Impartial Hearings under the IDEA, 302
Educ L Rptr 1, 10–11 (2014) (Appendix).
254 Id. It is also worth noting that the number of hearings by jurisdiction varies significantly. Some states have fewer than ten hearings annually, on average, while some
have several hundred.
255 Perry A. Zirkel and Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education Litigation:
An Updated Analysis, 265 Ed L Rptr 1, 5 (2011) (Table 2). The data compiled by the authors counted cases from 2000 to 2009 using Westlaw’s KeyCite system.
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Turning to an example illustrating deterrence in practice,
allowing exhaustion in a case involving an in-school arrest
would have a two-fold effect. First, such a rule would deter overuse of school resource officers (uniformed police officers stationed at schools). Admittedly, such a deterrent effect would be
small: not all in-school arrests are of children with IEPs nor are
all in-school arrests of children with IEPs related to a denial of a
FAPE. Nonetheless, many are.256 Waiving exhaustion might reduce those cases to some extent and compel more faithful introduction and implementation of de-escalation techniques instead
of dependence on police. In addition, waiving exhaustion may
also help clear a path to justice for children who ought to have
been nurtured at school but instead were arrested.
This example is particularly salient in the context of the
school-to-prison pipeline and its disproportionate impact on both
students of color and students with disabilities. Youth of color
are both overrepresented in special education (and certain special education categories in particular) and in school discipline.257 Youth in the juvenile justice system are also several
times more likely to need special education services than children outside of the system.258 According to the US Department of
Education, students served by the IDEA “represent a quarter of
students arrested and referred to law enforcement, even though
they are only 12% of the overall student population.”259 Moreover, and perhaps unsurprisingly, a racial disparity is also reflected in the population of students with disabilities arrested in
school. In Chicago in 2013, about 40 percent of students receiving IDEA services were black, but of the 567 school-based arrests
of IDEA students, nearly 70 percent were of black students.260
256 See US Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data Collection Data Snapshot: School Discipline (Mar 21, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/QWP9-Q89Z.
257 See generally Torin D. Togut, The Gestalt of the School-to-Prison Pipeline: The
Duality of Overrepresentation of Minorities in Special Education and Racial Disparity in
School Discipline on Minorities, 20 Am U J Gender Soc Pol & L 163 (2011).
258 Amanda Merkwae, Note, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct
of School Resource Officers, 21 Mich J Race & L 147, 152 (2016).
259 Data Snapshot: School Discipline at *1 (cited in note 256).
260 Civil Rights Data Collection: Discipline of Students with Disabilities—SchoolRelated Arrest, City of Chicago SD 299 (Department of Education), archived at
http://perma.cc/PJ4P-BXTU. This is not unique to Chicago. In Boston in 2013, black students accounted for fewer than half of students receiving special education, but more
than three-quarters of in-school arrests of special education students were of black students. US Department of Education, Civil Rights Data Collection: Discipline of Students
with Disabilities—School-Related Arrest, Boston (Department of Education), archived at
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Again, not every arrest will amount to a denial of a FAPE.261 But
in the face of this disparate impact, deterring, even slightly, the
use of school resource officers for student behavior can only help
schools’ most vulnerable populations.
The more common examples, albeit still rare in the scheme
of special education law, are cases like Abraham’s, along with
Witte and Covington. In these cases, the physical and psychological harms stemming from the alleged abuse at the hands of educators are readily apparent.262 Waiving exhaustion in cases like
this permits swifter awards of compensatory or, when appropriate, punitive damages. In turn, those judgments deter schools
and districts from committing these egregious violations. The
alternative is a due process hearing, a proceeding which both
cannot grant full redress for the harms incurred and which
wastes time, money, and goodwill for all parties. For most IDEA
cases, those faults might be forgivable because of exhaustion’s
merits. For these cases, in which the FAPE denial is of the nature
that only compensatory damages can redress the student’s injury,
justice requires swift and full resolution, which can be achieved
only in court.
5. Addressing the merits of requiring exhaustion.
The most commonly cited—and perhaps the most compelling—concern with respect to waiving exhaustion is that allowing waiver will create a pleading standard by which parents can
circumvent the due process hearing by merely asking for money.263
This is not an invalid concern, but it is overblown. First, for families with claims that are redressable by IDEA relief (not those
who are the subject of this Comment), due process is a more
attractive procedure than civil litigation. Said differently, for
http://perma.cc/7W8Y-XDMD. In Los Angeles, black students constituted nearly 11 percent of the population receiving IDEA services, but 30 percent of arrests of IDEA students. US Department of Education, Civil Rights Data Collection: Discipline of Students
with Disabilities—School-Related Arrest, Los Angeles Unified (Department of Education),
archived at http://perma.cc/92EM-8AVT. Where data are available, the list could go on.
261 Not all arrests might amount to a denial of a FAPE, but it would be a mistake to
think that students are arrested in schools for only the most serious of crimes. Many inschool arrests are for highly trivial behaviors. See Merkwae, Note, 21 Mich J Race & L at
154 (cited in note 258) (noting that “students are now being ticketed or charged with
crimes for behaviors that teachers or school administrators previously addressed” and
citing examples, such as an in-school arrest for doodling on a desk).
262 See Abraham P., 2017 WL 4839071 at *1–3; Witte, 197 F3d at 1272–74; Covington,
205 F3d at 913–14.
263 See, for example, Polera, 288 F3d at 489.
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families that can get relief from due process, the nature of the
procedure incentivizes proceeding through that route rather
than attempting to demand damages in court. The due process
hearing is less burdensome than litigation; it is more informal
and accessible to parents proceeding pro se; disputes may be resolved in mediation; and the hearing officer, while unable to give
compensatory or punitive damages as relief, nonetheless has latitude to craft many equitable remedies.264 Despite the hearing
officer’s breadth of available relief, some injuries simply cannot
be redressed by what the IHO can give. Nonetheless, for most
IDEA cases, the due process hearing is likely the more attractive
procedure—so long, of course, as that procedure can give meaningful relief to the aggrieved family. Waiving exhaustion is merited in the cases in which it cannot.
Even more fundamentally, the “pleading standard” complaint ignores the fact that the relief sought must still fit the
injury alleged. As discussed in Parts III.C.1–3, for most IDEA
cases, money damages will simply not be the most appropriate
form of relief. The cases in which this is a relevant question are
rare, and the facts involve some kind of above-and-beyond violation that merits damages over IDEA relief. This solution requires judges to sort out the types of claims for which money
damages are appropriate from the run-of-the-mill cases in which
compensatory education (or the like) would be adequate.265
Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit in
Charlie F., doubted this was possible: “Perhaps Charlie’s adverse reaction to the events of fourth grade cannot be overcome
by services available under the IDEA and the regulations, so
that in the end money is the only balm. But parents cannot
know that without asking, any more than we can.”266 His concerns are misguided. Determining whether the desired relief fits
the facts is what judges do all the time when faced with civil litigation. It is not a stretch to say that judges are capable of
weeding out those unique cases in which damages are the most

264

See Reid, 401 F3d at 523–24.
This solution also trusts that judges can spot a prayer for prospective services
disguised as a prayer for compensatory damages. See Payne, 653 F3d at 877:
265

If the measure of a plaintiff’s damages is the cost of counseling, tutoring, or
private schooling—relief available under the IDEA—then the IDEA requires
exhaustion. In such a case, the plaintiffs are seeking the same relief, even if
they are willing to accept cash in lieu of services in kind.
266

Charlie F., 98 F3d at 993.
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appropriate relief. Indeed, judges should scrutinize the complaint to determine whether the prayer for compensatory or
punitive damages fits the alleged injury.267
Of course, due process hearings have other merits. As a
general matter, exhaustion of administrative remedies allows
for the development of a record. In addition, IHOs possess deep,
relevant experience in this area of the law, which is nontrivial
when dealing with the alphabet soup of education law. State education agencies have an interest in resolving the dispute locally.
These are good reasons for due process hearings, and those
benefits will necessarily be sacrificed each time exhaustion is
waived. However, these are reasons meriting caution, not for requiring universal exhaustion. Even post-Fry, these benefits apply
with equal force but are nonetheless forgone by waiving exhaustion when the gravamen of the complaint does not allege a denial of a FAPE; yet the Court has put its imprimatur on waiver in
that class of cases. The Court, then, is willing to sacrifice these
benefits in favor of faithful adherence to the statute. As explained in this Part, the statute demands waiver in cases that
allege a denial of a FAPE but properly demand a form of relief
that the IDEA cannot provide as well.
In addition, due process hearings prevent at least some litigation from clogging judges’ dockets. Nonetheless, due process
hearings are patently futile for parents seeking these particular
forms of relief, and futility is a well-established exception to exhaustion.268 Indeed, it is deeply inefficient to force parents
through a hearing that, by law, cannot grant the relief they are
seeking. Batchelor, despite insisting on exhaustion, demonstrates the inefficient use of resources that stems from mandating exhaustion in these cases. The Third Circuit wrote that
“after exhaustion, [the student] may very well file a complaint
containing virtually identical claims as asserted in the” original
complaint.269 In essence, then, both the plaintiffs and schools
must go through litigation twice, the first time with no chance of
students walking away with their problem adequately solved if
compensatory or punitive damages were appropriate all along.

267 See FRCP 8(a) (stating that a complaint must both specify the relief the plaintiff
seeks and the reasons why the plaintiff is entitled to that relief).
268 See Hoeft, 967 F2d at 1303 (“Excusing exhaustion in cases of futility and inadequacy is based both on general exhaustion principles and on the legislative history of the
IDEA.”) (citation omitted).
269 Batchelor, 759 F3d at 278 n 15.
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So while exhaustion might prevent some cases from making it to
court, IHO officers will see more cases for which they cannot
provide the appropriate relief. As the solicitor general pointed
out in his brief for the Frys, “requiring exhaustion would force
the plaintiff (and school district) to participate in a timeconsuming, adversarial, and potentially costly due process hearing that will likely create unnecessary administrative burdens
for all involved.”270 This might prevent a case from entering the
courtroom, but it also uses taxpayer dollars to fund an extraneous hearing as a sham procedural prerequisite. Moreover, prolonging the adversarial process risks eroding the relationship
between the parties, reducing the chances of a mutually agreeable settlement. Such a requirement does not provide justice for
these children—at best, it delays it.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued in favor of waiving the exhaustion requirement when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief for
denial of a FAPE. This conclusion is rooted in statutory interpretation of § 1415(l) as informed by the plain-language reading
of the provision, case law, and comparable statutes. Moreover,
such a conclusion is both aligned with the purpose of the IDEA
and sound as a matter of policy.
As explained in Part III, this Comment does not argue for a
pleading standard. Parents cannot simply say the magic words
“compensatory damages” and evade the due process hearing.
Judges should scrutinize the plaintiff’s complaint to ensure that
the relief requested is, indeed, the appropriate form of relief.
Judges are free, too, to dismiss a case insofar as the relief sought
is available under the IDEA while letting litigation continue to
the extent that damages are the appropriate remedy.271 Even so,
concurrent litigation will not always be necessary—if the family
is happy with the current IEP but suing for a past denial of a
FAPE, for example, they may choose to only seek relief that is
unavailable under the IDEA.
Moreover, the number of cases in which that is the case is
likely small. Those cases distinguish themselves from run-ofthe-mill IDEA cases because of their egregious fact patterns—

270

Solicitor General Brief at *27 (cited in note 95).
This is the approach taken in a recent post-Fry district-court case. See A.M. v
Fresno Unified School District, 2017 WL 6209389, *8–10 (ED Cal).
271
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compensatory education or other IDEA relief is simply not commensurate with the alleged injury. As in the case of Abraham in
Los Angeles, the harm underlying the prayer for relief cannot be
addressed by typical IDEA remedies. Judges are well equipped
to weed out these cases.
The common thread between these kinds of cases, in which
a child is denied a FAPE and monetary relief is appropriate, is
that helping the student catch up academically is not enough.
These students deserve more justice than mere school-related
services can provide, a notion rooted in sound legal principles of
relief and in the purpose of the IDEA as a protection for disabled
children against apathetic schools. Moreover, schools and districts are currently not paying for the most egregious harms
they commit against disabled students, at least not fully or
promptly.
When a student like Abraham—who has endured trauma at
the hands of trusted adults, but is, by all accounts, now doing
fine—asks for relief from the courts, we crave both justice on his
behalf and assurance that children like him will not suffer going
forward. Moreover, we hope that the procedures that get us to
this result are swift. In response to Justice Kagan’s question in
footnotes four and eight of Fry, the solution is simple and rooted
in the text of § 1415(l). The answer must be to waive exhaustion
in cases in which the plaintiff alleges a denial of a FAPE but
requests relief that is unavailable under the IDEA.

